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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
William H. Johnson 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Department of International Studies 
 
September 2014 
 
Title: A Critique of the International Anti-Corruption Debate: Lessons From El Salvador 
and Pakistan 
 
 
Corruption is an age-old problem that affects every society, government, and 
institution.  In recent decades it has received considerable attention from scholars, 
development experts, and global policy-makers, and anti-corruption reforms now exist in 
nearly every country in the world.  Unfortunately, decades of research and activism have 
created a proliferation of data and policy prescriptions that continue to follow a set of 
narrow, misguided assumptions about the causes and consequences of this serious 
problem.  This is a critique of the perspective that has dominated the international anti-
corruption debate.  Building upon comparative research conducted in El Salvador and 
Pakistan, this thesis sheds light on how these narrow-minded assumptions lead to 
misguided and ineffective anti-corruption efforts in two distinct regions of the world.   
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
A.  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Corruption is an age-old problem that exists in every society.  In certain parts of 
the world, however, corruption reaches a pervasive, systemic level that influences all 
aspects of the relationship between a citizen and his or her government. Once corruption 
reaches this systemic level it erodes state legitimacy, thus further decreasing respect for 
the rule of law and increasing the potential for violence and conflict. Impunity is a 
necessary condition for systemic corruption, and when impunity becomes pervasive it 
acts to reinforce levels of both corruption and violence within a society.   
Corruption became a hot topic for scholarly research and governmental action in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s due to twenty years of large, headline-grabbing corruption 
scandals in both Western states and the developing world.1  The creation of Transparency 
International (TI) in 1993 provided the framework for what would soon become a global 
anti-corruption movement.  TI’s first major accomplishment, the Corruption Perceptions 
Index or CPI, represented the first attempt to measure and compare corruption across 
countries and regions, and since this time numerous other studies have been completed to 
address the causes and effects of corruption throughout the world.  This proliferation of 
corruption-related research provided a wealth of data and new perspectives on the 
problem, yet arguably this has not translated into successful anti-corruption policies or 
improvements at the local, national, or international level.  Despite the efforts of 
                                                
1 The term “developing” comes with significant baggage and controversy, as does its counterparts 
“third world”, “global south”, etc.  Dissecting the historical and other related controversies behind this 
choice of language is beyond the scope of this thesis.  I use these words interchangeably to refer to 
countries that, by and large, receive or have received development aid or support from the U.S., European 
countries, the OECD, the Soviet Union (when it existed) or other large donor countries. 
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countless individuals and organizations – and billions of dollars spent - progress has been 
slow. 
This lack of progress can be explained in part by the fact that any attempt to 
combat corruption must first overcome the complexity of the topic itself.  Two initial 
questions arise: First, how should we define corruption?  Second, how can we measure 
something that is almost by definition done in secret?  Putting aside for the moment the 
question of who should be defining and measuring corruption, which is discussed in 
detail below, these seemingly simple questions continue to confound most corruption 
scholars and anti-corruption organizations.  The CPI and other related measurements 
attempt to overcome these initial obstacles by measuring perceptions of corruption 
instead of specific corrupt acts.  Like other reports that have followed it, the CPI is an 
aggregate measurement of perceptions drawn from members of the international 
community, i.e. businessmen and women, foreign government employees, academics, 
and employees of international or non-governmental organizations.  These studies 
represent the foundation of global anti-corruption efforts yet, while helpful for moving 
the corruption debate forward, they have too-often focused on misguided understandings 
of the problem; policies built upon these studies often lead to perverse or counter-
productive outcomes.  For example, a country’s ranking can shape local perceptions of 
corruption in unintended ways, and it often directly or indirectly affects the availability of 
necessary development tools such as foreign direct investment, international development 
aid, and even bi-lateral economic and strategic relations.  Furthermore, flawed 
methodologies lead to misguided and eventually ineffective domestic and international 
anti-corruption policies.  My research with two anti-corruption agencies, the Tribunal de 
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Ética Gubernamental in El Salvador and the National Accountability Bureau in Pakistan, 
highlight how a misguided understanding of the causes and consequences of corruption 
lead to anti-corruption agencies with narrow mandates and limited power.  I argue that 
this pattern further reinforces levels of corruption and impunity in a society by de-
legitimizing the very state institutions created to address the problem. 
Many corruption studies focus on the economic nature of the problem and often 
reach conclusions that simply blame the failure of newly implemented economic policies 
in developing countries on the corruption inherent in these “weak” states.2  In this way 
corruption has been largely (if not exclusively) defined by Western norms and is often 
seen as a problem inherent to poor, developing states led by corrupt leaders and bloated 
bureaucracies.  This contextualization of the problem is inadequate.  It places 
responsibility for solving the “corruption problem” on Western educated elites from 
international institutions while simultaneously placing blame for corruption (and its 
consequences) on the local population and government.  This approach also ignores the 
implications high levels of corruption have for violence and the rule of law, which in turn 
leads to the creation and enforcement of anti-corruption agencies with narrow economic 
foci (e.g. asset recovery).  Furthermore, this misguided approach to what is a complex yet 
universal problem buttresses the belief that some societies, regions, or peoples are simply 
more “corrupt” than others, which reinforces outdated notions of “developed and 
underdeveloped,” “modern and primitive,” etc.  
                                                
2 See, e.g. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York: 
Academic Press, 1978).  This approach was especially common in the earliest years of anti-corruption 
research, i.e. the 1970s through 1990s.  Although there has been some effort to move away from this focus 
in recent years, the bulk of the literature retains undertones of this perspective.   
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Defining and understanding corruption is extremely challenging.  This is because 
corruption – and what is considered “corrupt” behavior – varies not only by geography 
and culture but also by institution.  In a general sense, corruption is most often associated 
with politicians and civil servants who receive bribes or other rewards in exchange for 
providing what should be (relatively) free or at least impartial public services.  While this 
type of corruption is certainly problematic and prevalent in many societies, it is not 
necessarily the most detrimental.  Although most corruption related research and policy 
reforms have addressed this type of political or administrative corruption, judicial 
corruption may have a more potent and direct impact on the lives of those most affected 
by corrupt state institutions: the general public.  Political and administrative corruption 
certainly impedes economic development and limits the ability of average citizens to 
access state resources, but it does not necessarily undermine the legitimacy of the state 
itself.  In some cases, it may even provide an alternative yet consistent method of 
distributing public resources.   
When the public believes that the judiciary is corrupt and impunity runs rampant, 
this erodes perceptions of state legitimacy and respect for the rule of law, which often 
increases violence, illegal activity, and both public and private corruption.  This is 
especially problematic in so-called “transitional” countries that are attempting to rebuild 
their society in a post-conflict environment.  While these problems have been openly 
discussed for decades, few scholars have specifically focused on the role that 
(perceptions of) judicial corruption plays with respect to larger questions of adherence to 
the rule of law, state legitimacy, and peace.3  More research needs to be completed asking 
                                                
3 See Eric Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). This is the most recent book that focuses directly on how perceptions of judicial 
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questions about how lawyers and human rights activists within a “corrupt” society 
perceive of and attempt to combat corruption, and specifically how these actors view 
corruption as a roadblock to their work.   
Globally, scholars and policy makers alike need to better understand how 
corruption is dynamic in both definition and effect, and they must also consider non-
economic effects.  I argue that corruption and impunity should be reframed as legal issues 
that inhibit the rule of law and administration of justice, especially in relation to security 
and human rights.  This perspective will help the anti-corruption movement move away 
from traditional definitions that view corruption and impunity as simply economic 
inefficiencies prone to developing countries (a perspective I call the “hole in the bucket” 
analysis that sees corruption simply as the failure of weak leaders to allocate resources 
appropriately).  While some scholars have acknowledged the link between perceptions of 
corruption and rule of law issues, few have directly addressed it.4  The purpose of this 
thesis is to show why that must be done.  
In the pages that follow I review and then critique the dominant corruption 
perspective and show how it leads to unsuccessful anti-corruption reforms.  I supplement 
this critique with independent research conducted in two distinct countries that suffer 
from similar levels of corruption and impunity: El Salvador and Pakistan.  My critique 
builds upon and adds to the work of scholars from far-reaching disciplines, including law, 
                                                                                                                                            
corruption (or unfairness), among other factors, reinforce inequality, low levels of trust, and in some cases 
violence.  I rely heavily on Uslaner’s work throughout this thesis. 
 
4 See, generally, Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law; for a more theoretical 
approach see Laura S. Underkuffler, Captured by Evil: The idea of corruption in law, (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2013). 
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political science, economics, geography, and sociology.  This is because corruption, like 
my educational background, is interdisciplinary in nature.   
B.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Through my research I attempt to understand how lawyers and non-lawyers alike 
work with (and within) judicial systems that the international community considers 
extremely corrupt.  I focus on perceptions and misperceptions of corruption across 
societies, with an emphasis on how and why different cultures define corruption 
differently.  This culturally sensitive context helps me to better address the causes and 
consequences of systemic corruption in otherwise diverse regions of the world.  Thus, 
although my focus countries are different in many ways, I used nearly identical 
methodologies in each.  Through this research I also hoped to draw clearer links between 
corruption and impunity, and violence, although, for reasons discussed below, I had more 
success drawing these connections in El Salvador than in Pakistan.  My goal for this 
thesis is that it will help reframe the corruption debate so that lawyers, scholars, and 
policy makers see corruption as a rule of law issue, and not simply an impediment to 
economic growth.   
This thesis is built largely on bibliographic research, which is supplemented with 
qualitative field research.  I read, analyzed, and critiqued the perspectives of nearly two-
dozen corruption scholars, along with several international organizations and the most 
prominent anti-corruption NGO, Transparency International.  The bibliographic research 
created the foundation for my critique of the international anti-corruption debate.  My 
critique is further supported by independent research I conducted in El Salvador and 
Pakistan.  My findings in each country support my larger critique and provide unique 
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insights into possible avenues through which the international anti-corruption movement 
could be reframed.   
Despite the methodological challenges inherent in researching this topic, from a 
practical standpoint it is surprisingly easy to get people to speak openly about corruption.  
For this and other reasons, my field research was qualitative in nature.  In El Salvador 
and Pakistan I conducted formal and informal interviews, participant observation, and 
regularly monitored various forms of media.  I attempted to interview roughly the same 
number and type of individuals in both countries, yet due to access limitations and the 
realities of conducting fieldwork the numbers do not align exactly.  I used a hand-held 
audio recorder whenever possible, and supplemented this with vigorous note-taking; in El 
Salvador, nearly all of my interviews were recorded yet in Pakistan only one person 
allowed it.  Nonetheless, in both countries I asked the same questions to the same type of 
people and conducted almost identical analysis of local and international news media. 
In each of the formal interviews I began with a simple question: how do you see 
corruption as a barrier to your work?  Due to the unique and sensitive nature of the 
problem being discussed, I remained flexible with respect to the structure of each 
interview.  Each interview was scheduled to last between fifteen and forty-five minutes, 
although at least two interviews in each country lasted more than two hours.  In each 
country I attempted follow-up interviews whenever possible, though I was able to do this 
with only about 1/3 of my research subjects.  Most interviewees spoken openly and freely 
about their opinions, experiences with, and concerns about corruption in their respective 
country or institution, yet each took the conversation in their own specific directions.  
  8 
Regardless, I continued to work off a set of key questions that emphasized my underlying 
research goals and assumptions.  These questions included:  
• What do you think are the key causes and consequences of corruption in 
[El Salvador or Pakistan]? 
• How do you see corruption acting as a barrier to the rule of law in [El 
Salvador or Pakistan]? 
• What are your perceptions about the level and extent of corruption in your 
country, and how does that compare with international perceptions (i.e. 
Transparency International rankings or perceptions from international 
news media)?  
• What links, if any, do you see between corruption and violence in your 
country?  
• Do you believe corruption can or should be combated and, if so, how?   
In each interview I also asked questions related to that subject’s professional or 
personal experiences with corruption.  When interviewing public attorneys, judges, or 
other government officials, for example, I asked them to explain how corruption 
complaints were handled within their individual institution.  When speaking with private 
attorneys or human rights activists I asked them to describe their experiences working 
with state institutions that they considered corrupt (specifically the legal system).  
Finally, I held in-depth interviews with high-ranking representatives from the domestic 
anti-corruption agency in each country.  In these interviews I asked the aforementioned 
questions but also spent considerable time discussing the mandate, procedures, and day-
to-day strengths and limitations of their respective anti-corruption agency. 
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The research environment in El Salvador was surprisingly open.  This is in part 
due to the fact that I had previously spent three months working in the country alongside 
well-known scholars and human rights activists, and many of them helped connect me to 
the public or private officials I would later interview.  Despite mounting violence and a 
very contentious political situation (related to calls for the repeal of the Amnesty law), no 
interview subjects denied my request and only a few balked at direct questions.   
In El Salvador I held formal, audio-taped interviews with seven Salvadoran 
government officials: representatives of the Salvadoran Human Rights Ombudsman’s 
office, including the Adjunct Ombudsman; two officials from the Corte de Cuentas, 
including a judge who oversaw inter-agency disputes related to corruption or 
misappropriation of funds; a member of the Foreign Ministry’s human rights division; 
and three members of the (then-newly created) anti-corruption agency, the Tribunal de 
Ética Gubernamental.  I also held formal, audio-taped interviews with the Executive 
Directors of two human rights organizations that had pursued corruption-related cases in 
the courts, three private human rights attorneys, and an anti-corruption activist.  Finally, I 
held formal yet unrecorded interviews with a Supreme Court Justice, the then-Vice 
President of the El Salvador, two deputies of the El Salvador’s legislature, two 
representatives from the US State Department and a USAID employee in charge of 
overseeing USAID’s Democracy and Governance programs in El Salvador.  These 
interviews were shorter in length, more limited in content, and at times were structured 
around other formal meetings or informal social gatherings that I participated in.  In some 
cases my questions were reviewed and pre-selected before the event, which limited my 
ability to hold conversations or ask follow-up questions.  Nonetheless, even the “non-
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answers” I received from politicians and high-ranking government officials at times 
spoke volumes about the extent and nature of the corruption problem in El Salvador. 
Additionally, I held informal interviews with nearly thirty members of the general 
public: scholars and law students, victims of human rights abuses, restaurant owners, 
hotel employees, etc.  These informal interviews allowed me to describe my project in an 
unstructured way and get real-time, uncensored feedback from individual citizens about 
the level and extent of the corruption problem in their country.  These interviews also 
provided me with an invaluable perspective on the way perceptions of corruption 
manifest within the public sphere, which when combined with the analysis of news media 
further informed my critique of the international anti-corruption debate. 
In Pakistan I held formal interviews with seven members of the Pakistani bar, 
including Supreme Court advocates and public and private attorneys at all levels; six 
government officials, including two high-ranking career civil servants and four 
representatives of Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau; and six academics, 
including professors in the fields of law, political science, international relations, and 
governance.  I also held informal interviews with various businessmen, students, and 
foreigners (including one US State Department official) who had experienced corruption 
through their interactions with the Pakistani judicial system or other government 
ministries.  These interviews provided valuable insights into the corruption debate, and 
also to what I believe were changing perceptions of state legitimacy in the lead-up to the 
May 2013 elections. 
As in El Salvador, I also monitored and analyzed news media in Pakistan in an 
effort to better understand how the corruption debate was informed and shaped by local, 
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national, and even international organizations.  Not surprisingly, corruption is a popular 
topic of discussion in both the traditional and electronic media in Pakistan, and politicians 
throughout South Asia have staked their candidacies on anti-corruption platforms.  The 
2012 dismissal of Prime Minister Gilani in connection with President Zardari’s Swiss 
corruption case was still fresh on peoples’ minds, and the unexpected wave of support for 
Imran Khan’s PTI party in the 2013 elections rested at least partly on his anti-corruption 
rhetoric.  Even more so, the Chief Justice’s seemingly unrelenting anti-corruption crusade 
was daily fodder for newspapers, political pundits, and the general public alike.  I believe 
that these and other similar events partially explain why, despite concerns of violence or 
other retribution, most people in Pakistan were ready and willing to openly share their 
perceptions of corruption with me. 
Despite this openness the research environment in Pakistan remained complicated 
in ways that I did not experience in El Salvador; this is, in my experience, especially true 
for Americans.  My visa process was drawn out and complicated, and in the end I was 
only given a short-term tourist visa, which meant I had to be relatively careful about how 
I advertised my visit.  Similarly, the limited temporal scope of the visa forced me to be in 
Pakistan during the national elections, which presented both a problem and an 
opportunity.  The wave of pre-election violence, in conjunction with General Musharraf’s 
return to the country and subsequent indictment, made courthouses and some government 
buildings almost completely inaccessible to me.  I was unable to interview several judges 
and other officials who had previously agreed to meet with me.  That being said, the 
security situation in Islamabad and Lahore was better than I expected, and I rarely if ever 
felt uncomfortable or unsafe moving about the large urban areas.  On the other hand, 
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distrust and animosity towards the US government continues to affect the research 
environment for Westerners.  Backlash from the 2012 raid in Abbottabad that killed 
Osama Bin Laden remained strong, and thus my movements and activities were restricted 
and at times monitored.  For example, I had been invited to Swat with a high-level 
Pakistani attorney to view some corruption-related court proceedings, but upon arrival in 
Pakistan he told me that new checkpoints had been erected and I would never get the 
documentation required to enter that region of the country.   
The continuingly contentious nature of US drone strikes in Pakistan also 
presented issues, as I was regularly confronted in public or even during lectures and 
asked to justify my country’s policies in Pakistan.  These seemingly random questions 
about US policies clouded countless conversations I was trying to have with Pakistanis 
and created uncomfortable situations that I am certain would discourage many 
researchers.  However, because corruption was also a key election issue, these challenges 
also presented me with an invaluable opportunity for studying the way the corruption 
debate unfolds in the Pakistani media and with the public.  Everyone I interacted with 
throughout my visit was willing to discuss the ongoing corruption problems in Pakistan, 
what various leaders promised to do to combat corruption, and what, if anything, could 
realistically be accomplished in terms of anti-corruption initiatives.  In this context the 
informal interviews I held with students, academics, businessmen, and others informed 
my research almost as much as the pre-planned interviews I conducted with members of 
the Pakistani bar.    
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Corruption is, as the legal scholar Laura Underkuffler argues, “the most powerful 
word in the English language.”5  I argue that the word is this powerful precisely because 
of its dualistic nature: it is a well-known and commonly used term, yet it hard to define 
and can mean many, many different things in different contexts.  Therefore, any study of 
corruption must address several basic yet extremely complicated questions: What is 
corruption, and how has it been understood historically?  How do scholars and policy 
makers define corruption?  How can corruption be accurately measured if it is by 
definition done in secrecy, behind closed doors, and often does not involve a tangible 
product that can be traced (such as drugs or even human beings)?  What makes 
corruption inherently “bad”?  Assuming that it is “bad”, how and why should corruption 
be combated?  What exactly do anti-corruption agencies or “national integrity systems” 
(NIS) actually do?  Finally, what are the links between levels of corruption and levels of 
violence, and how might public perceptions of corruption affect those links?   
Although there is little universal agreement about the answers to these questions, 
there is almost universal acceptance on two key points: corruption is defined most 
broadly as the use of public office for private gain;6 and corruption is a truly global 
problem that negatively affects every state or large institution, albeit in different forms 
and to varying extents.  Corruption can represent the commission of an act or the failure 
                                                
5 Underkuffler, Captured by Evil: The idea of corruption in law, 1. 
 
6 This definition is so ubiquitous as to almost need no citation.  See Robert Klitgaard et. al, 
Corrupt Cities: A Practical Guide to Cure and Prevention (Oakland, CA: Institute for Contemporary 
Studies Press, 2000), 2; Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
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to act, and many argue that it may involve both legal and illegal activities.7  
Unfortunately, these basic definitions represent the bulk of consensus on the issue; In the 
anti-corruption policy-world, disagreement abounds.  To better understand corruption as 
a scholarly topic I will first situate the concept historically and then attempt to address the 
never-ending “definitions debate”.8  I will then distinguish between types or levels of 
corruption and outline how, if at all, corruption can be measured.  I will then describe 
some of the key consequences of corruption, which will be followed by an overview of 
the various models by which corruption has been addressed at the domestic and 
international level.  This background material will lay the foundation for what I call the 
“dominant perspective,” i.e. the ideological perspective that has dominated the anti-
corruption debate for decades.  This literature review will also provide support for my 
main argument: the dominant perspective is lacking and misguided, which in turn leads to 
ineffective institutional reforms and weak anti-corruption agencies.   
A.  HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Plato is perhaps the most famous ancient corruption scholar, though surely he 
would not have described himself this way.  In his discussion of the three types of 
“corrupted” or “perverted” governments – democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny – he 
explained that leaders should be entrusted with power so long as they acted with reason 
and virtue, i.e. in a way that conformed with how society justified their power.9  This 
perspective mirrors later writings by Aristotle, Thucydides, and Machiavelli, all of which 
                                                
7 Klitgaard et. al, Corrupt Cities, 2. 
 
8 See, e.g., Michael Johnston, “The Definitions Debate: old conflicts in new guises,” in The 
Political Economy of Corruption, ed. Arvind K. Jain (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), 11-31. 
 
9 Johnston, “The Definitions Debate,” 11. 
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associated corruption “less with actions of individual leaders than with the moral health 
of entire societies.”10  Throughout much of human history, leaders claimed power 
through forms of rigid social hierarchy, but those hierarchies were expected to - and 
justified on the ground that they did - “enunciate society’s values and goals.”11  These 
regimes only became “corrupted” if they were guided by the interests of the rulers instead 
of the law, or what we would today call the public interest.12  As opposed to modern 
notions of a “corrupt official” or a “corrupt act”, at this point in time corruption referred 
“at least as much to the ends and justifications of power as to the ways it was used and 
pursued” by individual people.13  In this sense, corruption was defined as a “general 
disease on the body politic”.14  Although this perspective is often associated with Western 
thinkers, in reality it crosses the common East – West divide.  For example, in his famous 
treatise on statecraft, written in the fourth century B.C., the Indian Philosopher Kautiliya 
outlined the “forty ways of embezzlement” and provided detailed instructions for how 
leaders could prevent the corruption of government.15  The belief that corruption equals a 
form of dysfunctional or dishonest government that served its own personal interest(s) 
survives to this day.   
                                                
10 Johnston, “The Definitions Debate,” 12. 
 
11 Johnston, “The Definitions Debate,” 13. 
 
12 Carl J. Friedrich, “Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective,” in Corruption: Concepts and 
Contexts (3rd ed.), eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (London: Transaction Publishers: 
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Despite this historical consistency, the term corruption has always existed within 
or alongside another, more ambiguous concept: morality.  The Ancient Greek word 
Diaptheirei, commonly associated with corruption, referred to corruption of the mind, or 
the inability to make sound moral judgments.  Whether king, bureaucrat, priest, or 
layman, it was individuals that could be corrupt or act in corrupt ways.  On the other 
hand, the Latin term Corruzione refers to deterioration in the overall quality of 
government, regardless of the morality or “reason” used to justify specific individual 
actions.  These two definitions highlight the dualistic nature of corruption.  In the former 
sense corruption takes on an ethereal, almost religious sense that links it to earlier 
understandings of natural law; a person of sound mind and judgment uses reason to 
pursue the greater “good”, and one who does not or cannot do so is said to be corrupted.  
In the later sense corruption becomes legalistic in nature and more closely relates to how 
corruption is defined by modern, secular governments today.  Therefore, there is a 
tension between corruption seen as an immoral act, a disease that occurs within the mind 
and perhaps the soul of individual humans, and corruption as a form of illegal or 
inappropriate government behavior that subverts the interest of the public.  These two 
definitions are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they do not completely overlap.  
Lord Acton (perhaps unwittingly) represented the middle ground between these two 
concepts in his famous dictum “Power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely.”16  
The benevolent king, through self-interested or immoral acts, can quickly become the 
corrupt tyrant. 
                                                
16 John E. E. Dalton Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power, ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb (Glencoe, 
Ill: The Free Press, 1948), 364.   
  17 
Although a common understanding of corruption includes notions of morality, 
here it is important to note that our modern conception of corruption is directly linked to 
post-Enlightenment theories of power, government, and economics; in this sense 
corruption is always considered in relation to a public “good” that is being illegally or 
unfairly diverted from public use.  The rise of classical liberalism in the 17th, 18th, and 
19th centuries shifted standard beliefs about legitimate government away from notions of 
divine right to what are considered early forms of meritocratic democracies.  This shift, 
pushed forward by Enlightenment thinkers and the American and French revolutions, 
forever changed our understanding of what constitutes legitimate government.  Though 
imperfect, the early democracies built in the United States and Western Europe during 
this period represented the first time our modern understandings of corruption began to 
solidify.  This is because prior to this period most governments - and the men who ruled 
them - were expected to serve the public interest in a much more narrowly defined 
manner.  Kings, emperors, or oligarchs had supreme authority that they derived from 
either divine right or an overwhelming, almost unrestricted, control over the use of force; 
in many cases, rulers possessed both.  The king had the ability and right not only to 
promulgate the law but also to decide what is in the public interest, whether concerning 
religious, economic, or security concerns.17  What the King decreed was law, so almost 
by definition what the King did could not be corrupt (at least in the legal sense of the 
word). 
This is not to say that corruption did not exist in earlier times, but rather that it 
took different forms and was condemned for different reasons.  Because even “while the 
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King can do no wrong, his counselors [were] answerable to Parliament.”18  Individual 
public servants could be corrupt if they disobeyed the actions of the King in an effort to 
enrich themselves, but these acts were not necessarily considered corrupt because they 
violated a duty owed to the public; in fact, it was the moral duty owed to the king that 
was violated.  Yet at this time there was no real distinction between concepts of “public 
trust” and “private interest”19 because politics was, quite literally, nothing more than the 
exercise and protection of personal power.20  No individual owed an obligation to anyone 
other than the sovereign, and thus actions taken by the sovereign could not be corrupt in 
the modern sense of the word.  
Post-Enlightenment notions of “rule by the people, for the people” changed the 
understanding of what constituted a legitimate government, and the concept of corruption 
changed with it.  This period also saw the shift from mercantilism to capitalism, which 
further shaped the political and economic spheres along individualist, contractarian 
principles.  Industrialization and urbanization created new ways of attaining wealth.  
Small kingdoms consolidated around city-centers run by bankers, merchants, and private 
landowners, and these new power groups challenged classically conservative notions of 
government and power.  “Eventually, the rise of the money economy made regular 
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taxation possible, and the growth of government made it necessary.”21  Rulers needed 
expanded administrative and bureaucratic structures to manage this larger, more 
complicated urban populace.  These structures brought new opportunities for rent seeking 
by low and mid-level civil servants.22  Rent-seeking, defined by corruption scholar 
Michael Johnston as “extracting wealth from the economic system without contributing 
to productivity,” began to represent the new understanding of corruption.23  Rent seeking 
takes many different forms (discussed further below), but as a concept it exemplifies the 
shift from a moral or religious notion of corruption to one based on economics and 
personal enrichment at the expense of public duty.  This was the case even in Soviet 
Russia and other non-capitalist countries, and this economics-focused definition 
represents how corruption is widely understood today.24 
Considering this shift it is not surprising that the recent corruption debate has in 
many ways been dominated and defined by international financial and development 
institutions that emphasize neoliberal economic policies.  This is further explained 
through historical processes, i.e. that corruption became a policy and academic buzz-
word during neo-liberalism’s high point.  The elections of U.S. President Ronald Reagan 
(1980) and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979), the rise of the “Chicago 
School” of neo-liberal economic theory, the demise of the Soviet Union and 
proclamations for the “End of History” all combined to promote a market-oriented 
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explanation of - and solution to - most of the world’s problems.25  At the international 
level, decades of state-centered, top-down development projects proved unable to reduce 
poverty or develop what was then called the “third world” in a pattern similar to Western 
Europe’s post-Marshall Plan growth.  The failure of developing or third world countries 
to prosper in the United Nations’ development decade26 and beyond caused policy 
analysts in Washington and Europe to blame ineffective and overreaching state 
institutions and corrupt local leaders.  Dan Hough argues that this “lean government 
agenda” is part of the problem with the anti-corruption movement, as it only emphasizes 
remedies that “fit well with a preordained skepticism about the ability of government to 
deliver efficient and effective services . . .”.27 
Just prior to and during the rise of neo-liberalism, international aid and 
development became a key focus of foreign policy for many donor and recipient 
countries.  Due to the large sums of capital and political resources being exchanged, the 
demand for transparency rose.  As many underdeveloped countries failed to experience 
the economic and political development that international experts promised, corruption 
allegations and anti-corruption campaigns became a prominent part of the public debate.  
For donor countries it became politically unpopular (or at least contentious) to provide 
financial or other development assistance to countries whose leaders enriched themselves 
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at the expense of their people.28  Similarly, citizens in recipient countries turned their 
focus to corruption when they began to wonder why, in light of the reports of high levels 
of international assistance and financial donations from abroad, their living or security 
conditions were not improving.  By the 1980s, academics and policy makers were 
emphasizing a new development agenda founded on limiting the size of government 
while relying on market mechanisms to lift countries out of poverty and debt.  This 
intellectual shift – towards markets and away from government-centered programs – 
reached the highest levels of power in the Europe and the U.S.29   
By this time the major Western governments and international institutions that 
built on capitalist principles, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank (WB), the US Treasury Department, and bilateral development agencies such as 
USAID, shifted their development agendas towards enhancing “good governance” while 
limiting state power and increasing the role of markets in local economies.  As previously 
stated, at this point in time the failures of previous development policies30 were largely 
blamed on bloated governments, excessive regulation, and corrupt local leaders.  While 
no one would argue to promote bad governance, the governance agenda that evolved out 
of this period was ideologically skewed.  The belief was that pervasive corruption in 
developing countries served as an economic “hole in the bucket” that inhibited countries 
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from properly developing according to liberal economic principles; put simply, if corrupt 
local leaders had not drained otherwise valuable development dollars from their country’s 
coffers the positive economic and development projections would have been realized.  
On October 1st, 1996, James Wolfensohn, the President of the World Bank, spoke of the 
“cancer of corruption” at the 51st annual Meeting of the Board of Governors at the IMF.  
This speech was the moment “it became clear that for the international policy community 
tackling corruption was moving centre-stage.”31  By this time, policies of deregulation, 
privatization, capital market liberalization, and reductions in spending on social services32 
became tied to development loans and grants through structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs).33  The conditionalities included in these SAPs often included a market-centered 
approach to governance, which included privatization, transparency initiatives and other 
policies deemed necessary to disincentivize corrupt practices. 
Many current authors reject the belief that corruption is the reason “…why the 
pro-market economic reforms of the past two decades in the South have not [succeeded]” 
in the way they were expected to, and argue that this perspective is both imperialistic (by 
promoting the idea that “the ‘third world’ state is the source of corruption,”) and limiting 
(by not allowing those opposed to the neoliberal agenda to focus on or provide insight 
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into the anti-corruption debate).34  Some authors argue that, from this dominant 
perspective, corruption too quickly becomes “the excuse of apologists of capitalism in the 
wake of capitalism’s failures,” because “it is easier to criticize other peoples’ corrupt 
implementation of one’s strategies than to question the validity of those strategies 
themselves.”35  This perpetuates concepts of colonialism, dependency, and a blaming the 
victim mentality where the powerful (i.e. Western governments and institutions) take 
credit for policies when they produce positive outcomes and have a convenient scapegoat 
to blame when they do not.  Notwithstanding the strength of these critiques, the dominant 
perspective – and the research and programs that flow from it – continue to permeate the 
anti-corruption policy world to this day. 
Although corruption is a timeless problem, for reasons explained in the preceding 
paragraphs it has until recently only been focused on through very specific, case-by-case 
investigations.  For centuries bribery and ‘using public office for private gain,’ an oft-
cited definition of corruption, 36 was seen simply as a necessity for doing business in 
certain parts of the world and, by many, as a fundamental aspect of human behavior.37  
While this debate continues, it is safe to say that the general perception of corruption – 
regardless of how you define it – is that it is unethical and detrimental to society for a 
number of well-established reasons.   
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While well-known anti-corruption agencies were first developed in Hong Kong 
and Singapore in the 1950s-1970s, it was not until major Western scandals like Watergate 
exploded that lawmakers took the efforts to write and codify anti-corruption laws at the 
domestic and international level.38  These scandals awakened the Western world to the 
nature and extent of the problem, yet it took even longer for corruption to be treated as an 
appropriate topic of scholarly and policy planning debates.  The birth of Transparency 
International (TI) in 1993 saw for the first time a unified attempt to measure corruption 
around the world through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).39  These steps moved 
corruption as a concept beyond basic philosophical or moral debates about the duty of 
public officials; today corruption is the focus of foreign and domestic policy planning, the 
debate about the legitimacy and efficacy of international development assistance, and is a 
topic of choice for investigative journalists everywhere.  It is nearly impossible to flip 
through the international section of any major newspaper without seeing a headline about 
corruption and its common counterpart, impunity.   
This historical explanation of the corruption debate fails to answer perhaps the 
most fundamental question in any corruption study: what exactly is corruption, and how 
do we define such an ambiguous and amorphous term? 
B.  DEFINITIONS AND TYPES OF CORRUPTION 
“Any attempt to analyze the concept of corruption must contend 
with the fact that in English and other languages the word corruption has a 
history of vastly different meanings and connotations.”40   
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Corruption is ubiquitous and amorphous; it exists everywhere yet takes no one 
specific form.  Most humans - regardless of their education level, nationality, or culture - 
intuitively understand the word corruption, yet few can define it.  Although classical 
conceptions of corruption as relating to the morality of individuals or societies “have 
given way to more limited, modern definitions” that classify specific acts by specific 
persons, this has in no way “settled the matter.”41  Nearly every journal article or book 
written about corruption confronts this issue at the outset, and although most authors cite 
their own definition nearly all make clear that no single definition is free from 
controversy. 
Before turning to the complex and much-disputed definition of corruption it is 
appropriate to first provide basic definitions for some actions that are, for the most part, 
considered corrupt.  Bribery, perhaps the most quintessential form of corruption, is an 
illegal payment made to a government official in return for some type of official, state-
sanctioned act that 1) has a selective and tangible impact and 2) would not, in the absence 
of the payment, otherwise have been made.  Bribery can take its most common form, a 
direct handoff of cash, or can manifest in one of two alternate forms: Kickbacks and 
Extortion.  A kickback is a bribe paid after the service has been rendered, and is common 
among private individuals and organizations that bid on government contracts.  Extortion 
is when a public official threatens to use state power - legally or illegally - to induce the 
payment of a bribe; this is perhaps most common with government institutions that have 
direct and tangible control over peoples’ daily lives, such as police, prosecutors and 
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security forces.  Each of these acts generally involves a transaction between public and 
private individuals.   
Embezzlement occurs when government officials directly appropriate funds for 
alternate, generally private uses.  Fraud, on the other hand, refers to a wide range of 
(often) imaginative schemes orchestrated by public officials to illegally appropriate state 
funds.  Examples of fraud are as endless and diverse as the human imagination, but some 
common fraudulent acts include the creation of fake or “paper” companies, overcharging 
on government contracts, paying “ghost” employees, keeping two sets of accounting 
books, falsifying checks, or simply accepting payment for projects that are never 
completed.  While fraud often involves both public and private individuals, 
embezzlement is one of the few types of corrupt acts that often does not involve any 
inappropriate or illegal behavior by private individuals; sometimes embezzlement is 
overlooked in return for other actions but often it is completely unilateral.   
Nepotism is the giving of public sector jobs, contracts, or benefits to unqualified 
family members, while favoritism involves similar actions that involve friends, political 
supporters, or even “quid pro quo” exchanges with other government officials.42  A 
broader category of corruption covers actions where a conflict of interest exists, i.e. when 
officials make public decisions that directly or indirectly affect that official’s family, 
friends, business associates, or even personal financial interests.  Finally there are the 
numerous acts covered under the broad heading of “electoral corruption”: vote buying or 
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vote-rigging, electoral fraud, illegal campaign contributions, intimidation, or any number 
of actions that may violate a country’s specific electoral laws. 
Defining these individual acts may seem self-evident, but it does not solve the 
initial problem at hand: what is corruption, or, rather, what is it that makes these (or any 
other) actions corrupt?  The most common definition of corruption, according to authors 
such as Joseph Nye, is the “misuse of public power for private or political gains.”43  
Major institutions such as the IMF, the OECD, and the anti-corruption NGO 
Transparency International use nearly identical definitions.44  Public power, in this sense, 
is generally meant to refer to public officials, although this does not necessarily refer only 
to public office-holders.45  Political scientist Joseph Nye tries to expand the definition by 
describing corruption as  
“behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role 
because of private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of 
private-regarding influence.  This includes bribery (use of rewards to 
pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal 
of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and 
misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-
regarding uses).”46   
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Johnston calls these definitions “behavior-classifying,” and notes that despite all the 
disagreement most modern corruption definitions conform to this approach.47  
Heidenheimer argues that nearly all behavior classifying definitions fall into one of three 
broader categories: public-office centered (see quote by Nye, above); market centered 
(i.e. when a civil servant uses his public office as a profit-seeking enterprise); and public-
interest centered.48  While Public-office centered and market-centered definitions seem 
precise and easy to understand, public-interest centered definitions describe both the 
nature of the underlying act and its consequences.  Friederich’s definition is perhaps the 
best example of this category, one that incorporates both the legal and moral nature of the 
word corruption: “the pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power-holder 
. . . [is] induced to take actions which favor whoever provides rewards and thereby does 
damage to the public and its interest.”49  To Friedrich, corruption must incorporate 
certain actions by specific individuals that lead to perverse outcomes.  Unfortunately, as 
corruption scholar Michael Johnston argues, this perspective muddies the debate 
considerably because “the definition of corruption and its consequences are distinct 
issues.”50   
Johnston attempts to clarify the distinction between corrupt acts and the 
consequences of such acts while still retaining both the legal and moral nature of the 
problem.  He does this by defining corruption as “the abuse of a trust, generally one 
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involving public power, for private benefit which often, but by no means always, comes 
in the form of money.”51  He chooses his words carefully.  Terms like “generally 
involving” and “by no means always” highlights his concern that in many situations – 
especially in transitional democracies or newly liberalized economies – the line between 
public and private is quite unclear.  In this way his definition encompasses many acts by 
many individuals yet still does not divert from what most believe is the central tenet of 
corruption: the abuse of power for private gain.  That being said, some scholars continue 
to resist universal definitions by emphasizing their inapplicability in certain contexts.  For 
example, while the line between public and private may be clear in some countries 
(particularly Europe and the U.S.), it is not so elsewhere.  Peter Ekeh uses a historical 
analysis to explain why the public private divide is not the same in Africa as in the West, 
noting post-colonial societies in Africa often contained what he called “two publics”.52  
Some Asian scholars dispute the “private gain” component entirely, noting that some 
Asian governments consider actions that constitute dereliction of duty or immoral 
behavior corrupt regardless of whether the public official received, or even attempted to 
receive, any private gain.53 
Although these classifications have been discussed throughout decades of 
corruption-related literature they do little to remedy underlying definitional concerns.  
For example, the terms “misuse” and “gains” must be judged according to some standard, 
as does the concept of “public interest”.  In an attempt to clarify these concepts 
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corruption and corrupt acts are often defined either by legal or normative standards, or 
sometimes both.  Not surprisingly, legal standards tend to be more objective but less 
malleable, while normative measurements consider subjective or cultural perspectives 
that make comparisons across national or even institutional lines incredibly difficult.  As 
Robert Klitgaard makes clear, both perspectives present incredible challenges: 
emphasizing culture risks racially-biased, ethnocentric blaming that is too often 
disregarded as “emblematic of imperialist thinking,” while ignoring culture leads to 
ineffective policies created by what Myrdal termed uncritical “diplomacy in research.”54   
From a legal perspective, corrupt acts are defined by statute or administrative 
code, and thus that which is not illegal cannot be corrupt.  While this may be “convenient 
and unambiguous,”55 I agree with Uslaner that this legality paradigm “misses the mark 
for [at least] two reasons.”56  First, although statutes vary from place to place, the 
existence of a well-written corruption law tells us little about enforcement; in fact, often 
the most “corrupt” nations suffer more from a lack of enforcement than a lack of statutes.  
Second, statutes – and those who interpret statutes - often make fine distinctions that 
everyday citizens do not understand or agree with.  Trained lawyers who often have 
incentives to create legal gray areas or “loopholes” are the same individuals who write or 
vote on statutes.  This explains why many acts that are publically condemned as being 
corrupt may in fact be legal, while other acts that are widely tolerated may in fact be 
illegal and corrupt.   Furthermore, laws change, so a legal perspective on the definition of 
corruption allows governments to “legalize” what is otherwise widely believed to be 
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corrupt behavior;57 Scott refers to this problem as “proto-corruption.”58  Considering this 
it is not hard to conceive of a government that is abusive, unethical, or unfairly serving 
special interests yet is not actually considered corrupt because, according to a legal 
definition of corruption, it is not breaking the law.   
This in turn creates problems when corruption is compared across countries or 
within a single country across time, as written laws and formal norms of office tend to be 
“quite divergent” from one country to the next.59  Culture and tradition heavily inform 
law in developing countries in ways that are not immediately apparent to Western anti-
corruption reformers.  For example, otherwise functional and legal patronage networks in 
South Asia may be castigated because of their corrupt nature despite the fact that the 
public who accesses these networks do not necessarily want reform (see Pakistan section, 
below).60  Additionally, in heavily codified societies like the United States there is a 
tendency to implicitly give normative value to legal codes or official actions.  For 
example, there is very little scientific or legal justification for legalizing opiates in pill 
form but not in powder form, yet Americans undoubtedly view the consumption of heroin 
and oxycontin from two very different ethical perspectives.  Therefore, those who try to 
move away from a normative perspective by equating corruption with illegality may, in 
the end, simply shift the normative perspective of a society against newly illegal 
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activities.  By equating legality with ethics, this view risks pushing liberal jurisprudence 
back in line with the natural law theories that it left so long ago.61   
Defining corruption normatively presents its own problems.  Some scholars 
equate fairness and equality with ideal governments, thus linking partiality with 
corruption.62  Although this diminishes some of the problems raised about the legality 
approach, equating corruption with unfairness raises other significant concerns: it too 
narrowly focuses on the actions of government officials while ignoring private actors; it 
expands the concept of corruption beyond its already oversized definition; it conflates 
cause and effect because a fair legal system “does not preclude breaking the law”; it 
focuses too heavily on those that implement policy (e.g. low-level bureaucrats) and 
ignores those who create or flout policy, and; it ignores the fact that there are many 
reasons government officials may act unfairly that do not relate to misusing power for 
private gain (prejudice, racism, and sheer laziness are but a few examples).63  Finally, 
although social and cultural perspectives ought to be considered when designing and 
implementing anti-corruption policies, explicitly cultural definitions of corruption remain 
rare because public opinion and cultural standards vary across time, space, and even 
within segments of the same society.64   
Heidenheimer takes a unique normative perspective on corruption in his study on 
how different societies tolerate and evaluate behavior that is sometimes but not always 
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considered corrupt.  By focusing on perceptions of actions taken in specific public 
settings, and only considering what he calls “exchange transactions” (e.g. bribery), 
Heidenheimer outlines three “shades” of corrupt behavior: Black, Grey, and White.65  
Each of these shades is defined by normative perceptions of the public, not by legality.  
“Black corruption” exists when the there is a consensus of elite and mass opinion that a 
specific act, taken in a specific setting, is condemned and should be punished.  “Grey 
corruption” exists when some segments of society, usually elites, want the behavior 
condemned while others do not; with Grey corruption, often the majority of public 
opinion is ambiguous at best.  “White corruption” concerns otherwise corrupt acts that 
are tolerated by the majority of both elites and the mass public.  Whether the acts are 
legal or illegal, ethical or immoral, they are considered “white” if the majority of society 
do not wish to see the acts punished.  These shades of corruption are particularly helpful 
for distinguishing certain actions that may seem corrupt to the world yet are more or less 
tolerated by the people in the setting where the act occurred.66  
A third approach, espoused by Fisman & Miguel, emphasizes incorporating 
culture and local practices into anti-corruption reforms yet avoiding a cultural focus when 
defining, measuring, and classifying corruption as a problem.67  This perspective allows 
for standardization of research across disciplines and geographic regions while still 
allowing for flexibility in the implementation of concrete anti-corruption policies. 
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Some authors move beyond simply defining the word corruption and instead 
focus on defining and analyzing certain patterns of corrupt behavior at the meta-level.  
Although this approach does not solve the basic definitional problems discussed above, it 
paints a clearer picture of how corruption manifests in various political, social, or cultural 
contexts.  Whatever definition one chooses to use, understanding these broad categories 
is imperative for anyone who attempts to link the causes, consequences, and definitions 
of corruption with specific anti-corruption reforms.  Unfortunately, as with definitions, 
there is much disagreement, overlap, and ambiguity amongst scholars who define these 
categories or patterns of corrupt behavior. 
 Robinson attempts to clarify the definitions debate by separating corrupt acts into 
three distinct categories: incidental (individual), institutional (e.g. police corruption), and 
systemic (societal).68  Individual corruption relates to (ethical or legal) misdeeds 
committed by individual actors, such as individual politicians or public officials.  While 
problematic, individual corruption tends to be “episodic, rather than systemic,” and it 
arguably has less of an impact on government or society as a whole; individual corrupt 
politicians, for example, tend to be investigated or at least voted out of office before they 
can steal enough to drastically impact those they serve.69  Institutional corruption is 
common in sectors of government or industry that have high levels of rent-seeking 
opportunities combined with a weak system of controls and regulations.  Any institution 
that relies on underpaid, low-level officials to carry out important, daily functions with 
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the public can fall victim to this type of corruption.  Police forces, energy or resource 
distributors, and national education systems are prime examples of this; in each of these 
institutions low and mid-level government employees have significant contact with – and 
power over – regular citizens.  This is especially problematic in developing or transitional 
countries with limited resources and weak institutional frameworks.  Organized crime, 
drug-traffickers, gangs and even terrorist groups tend to infiltrate and sometimes even 
control institutions riddled by this type of corruption.70  However, most countries that 
experience only individual or institutional corruption are able to address it through ad hoc 
investigations or institutional reform meant to combat specifically this type of sporadic 
corruption problem.  This is possible because in these situations, “corruption is the 
exception, not the rule.”71  Systemic or societal corruption is different. 
 In a reaction to what he calls the “new consensus” regarding corruption’s link 
with democratization and development, Johnston emphasizes the importance of 
distinguishing between different economic and political opportunities available to 
individuals within complex societal and institutional frameworks.72  From this 
perspective he defines four “syndromes” of corruption commonly found in developing 
and developed countries (though his focus is mostly on the link between corruption and 
development).  These four syndromes, Influence Market Corruption, Elite Cartel 
Corruption, Oligarch and Clan Corruption, and Official Mogul corruption, “reflect 
frequently encountered combinations of stronger or weaker participation and institutions” 
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in a wide array of countries.73  Influence Market corruption involves efforts by private 
parties to “rent access and influence within well-institutionalized policy processes.”  
Perhaps the most common legal example of this is lobbying in the United States, 
although it takes different forms in many different countries.74  Elite Cartel corruption 
involves “networks of political, economic, military, bureaucratic, or ethnic and 
communal elites” who work together behind the scenes to sustain power in spite of 
increasing political competition.  This is often the case in countries with strong militaries 
that are also involved in the political and economic function of the state, e.g. Pakistan.  
Oligarch and Clan Corruption is defined by public officials and private entrepreneurs 
who generate an extensive following despite illegal and often violent behavior.  This 
syndrome is common in transitioning economies such as those in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia after the fall of the USSR, and it has recently become prevalent in the 
regions of Mexico and Central and South America where drug cartels hold significant 
influence over local governments and the public.75  Official Mogul corruption occurs 
when government officials (or their friends and families) “plunder the state with 
impunity,” as has been the case the Phillipines under Marcos, Zimbabwe under Mugabe, 
Indonesia under Suharto, and Nigeria under any number of political leaders since 
independence.  These individuals often pretend to justify their rule on popular support or 
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even divine right while simultaneously holding power through violence and the 
intimidation of opposition groups. 
Despite differences of opinion over definitions, the available literature clearly 
makes a distinction between sporadic corruption committed by individuals who break 
governmental and/or societal “rules” to enrich or otherwise benefit themselves, such as 
simple bribery, and widespread or deeply entrenched corruption that literally changes the 
rules of the game for all involved.  Robinson calls the latter type “societal” corruption, 
that which “pervades the entire society and in the process becomes routinised [sic] and 
accepted as a means of conducting everyday transactions.”76  Johnston calls this 
“systemic” or “entrenched” corruption, a type of corruption “that is not only more 
extensive [than individual or institutional corruption] but is also a qualitatively different 
problem, embedded in political and economic systems in ways that both reflect its impact 
and help sustain its force.”77  This type of corruption cripples governments and their 
ability to support or care for their citizens, and thus this type of corruption remains the 
most challenging to combat.  Unfortunately, for many countries experiencing this level of 
corruption, institutions strong enough to combat the problems do not exist and, even 
when they do exist, nearly always remain underfunded.78   
Countries such as Pakistan represent precisely this scenario, cases that Jeremy 
Pope, a co-founder of Transparency International, calls “systemic corruption: … the 
corrupt practices of numberless individuals perpetrated against ineffective institutions” in 
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a way that undermines not just specific public offices but the legitimacy of the state 
itself.79  Working loosely from that definition it is pertinent (when possible) to avoid 
solely focusing on front-page corruption scandals and look also at the overall attitudes of 
people at various levels within a society to see what people think and feel about 
corruption in their government.  It is important to understand how the perception of 
corruption affects the powerful and the powerless, the well-connected lawyer and the 
poor street vender, and through that lens one can attempt to address corruption outside of 
and/or beyond the economic lens through which it is generally seen.  By the time a 
society is confronting systemic corruption is evident to researchers that 
“Corruption [becomes] a crime of calculation, not passion.  . . . [There] are 
saints who resist all temptation, and honest officials who resist most.  But 
when the size of the bribe is large, the chance of being caught small, and 
the penalty if caught meager, many officials will succumb.”80 
 
Corruption exists everywhere, but when it reaches this pervasive, systemic level it 
influences the level of conflict throughout society and saps public trust in government.  
The existence of impunity is a necessary condition for systemic corruption, and when 
impunity becomes pervasive it acts to reinforce levels of corruption and violence within a 
society.  These two overlapping and at times mutually reinforcing problems plague many 
governments, institutions, and multinational corporations around the world yet, despite 
being illegal, many still believe that the existence of corruption and impunity simply 
represents a norm of human nature that cannot or will not change.  The adage that “power 
corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” is taken as truth in many circles, and 
psychologists who study power and its influence on corrupting behavior admit that 
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despite its incredible impact on the world we still know little about its causes or effects.81  
Nonetheless, scholars and policymakers continue to try to define corruption in hopes that 
it will help them measure, further understand, and eventually combat this severe problem. 
C.  MEASURING CORRUPTION  
A problem perhaps more vexing than defining or combating corruption is simply 
trying to get the necessary data.  This begs the question, how does one measure 
corruption?  Considering all the varying definitions of, and perspectives about corruption, 
and the legal and political sensitivity involved in corrupt acts, measuring corruption 
accurately presents perhaps the most complicated challenge to any corruption related-
research.  This problem raises important responses to any critique of Transparency 
International’s CPI or other related indices.  Put simply, this is an incredibly difficult 
problem to measure in any context, let alone from an international perspective, and 
Transparency International’s attempt – though flawed – has unquestionably moved the 
debate forward.   
Broadly speaking, there are two general methods used to measure corruption.  The 
first involves individual investigations or case-studies where tools of forensic accounting 
are used: for example, tracing money coming in and out of government or business 
coffers with an eye for matching those flows with proper expenditures, official salaries, 
and other purchases made (or bank accounts held) by suspected corrupt individuals.  This 
sometimes involves only specific individuals or offices, and in other cases it addresses 
entire administrations, industries, cities, or even nations.  Getting access to this data is 
extremely complicated and often dangerous, and even when sufficient data exists it 
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generally only covers a limited number of powerful individuals or institutions and, 
therefore, does not give an estimate of the overall corruption as experienced by the 
general public.   
The second method involves calculating aggregate measurements of perceptions 
of corruption, which is what Transparency International (and other agencies, such as the 
World Bank) measures.  This method attempts to study broader perceptions of corruption 
thereby minimizing the critique that it only targets a few specific, individual cases.  It 
does, however, come with its own critiques and methodological flaws, such as how data 
is measured and compiled, variance in perceptions (and language used to define 
perceptions) across cultures and peoples, questions about whose perceptions matter, etc.  
I outline Transparency International and the Corruption Perceptions Index in detail 
below, but before turning to that I will describe several alternate, case-study approaches 
to measuring corruption. 
In their recent book, Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty 
of Nations, economists Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel provide several unique 
examples of how corruption can be measured on a case-by-case basis.  In one example 
they attempt to measure how Indonesian President Suharto’s family became so wealthy.  
Suharto’s family, and especially his son Tommy, ran or held controlling shares in many 
supposedly legitimate Indonesian businesses.  In an effort to see whether these businesses 
were profitable in their own right, or whether they owed their success to the connections 
with the Suharto’s family, Fisman & Miguel monitored the stock prices of several 
Suharto family-owned businesses over a period of years.  More specifically, they 
monitored how the stock market reacted when news leaked that President Suharto was ill 
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and/or dying.82  Fisman & Miguel then compare one of Suharto’s son’s businesses, 
Bimantara Citra, with other businesses listed on the JSX stock exchange and the 
exchange average itself.  Fisman & Miguel posited that if these companies were truly 
functioning and profitable aside from their political connections then news of Suharto’s 
illnesses would not drastically affect their stock prices.  Not surprisingly, they found the 
opposite: shares in Bimantara Citra (and other companies dominated by Suharto 
relatives) dropped more than three times as much as the stock exchange average (the JSX 
composite) whenever news was leaked about Suharto’s failing health, and quickly 
rebounded as soon as the President returned to rule his country in a state of health.83  
Through this and other statistical analysis Fisman & Miguel were able to prove at least 
that “the collective wisdom of investors” in Indonesia and around the world was that 
these companies could no longer be profitable if Suharto was not in power. 
Another clever, yet relatively simple method for measuring corruption is 
highlighted through Fisman & Miguel’s study of smuggling between China and Hong 
Kong.  They first investigated tariff levels between China & Hong Kong to see what 
types of goods would provide the highest incentive for smuggling;84 perfumes, tobacco, 
foreign cars, industrial drilling machines, and even poultry had outrageously high tariffs.  
Some of these goods, however, would be harder to smuggle than others, so Fisman & 
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Miguel focused on poultry.  Turkeys imported into China face a 10% tariff, while 
chickens imported into China faced a 20% tariff.  Furthermore, turkeys were less popular 
in China than chickens and received a lower price per pound.  Therefore, there was a 
clear economic incentive to import chickens but pretend they were turkeys.  After 
comparing the number of chickens officially exported from Hong Kong to China, and 
cross-referencing that number with the number of chickens officially imported into China 
from Hong Kong, Fisman & Miguel quickly identified what they termed a “smuggling 
gap”.  Their conclusion is simple but clear: many more Hong Kong “turkeys” were being 
imported into China than had actually left Hong Kong in the first place.  This 
investigation was repeated with other types of goods, and Fisman & Miguel eventually 
concluded that this type of “sleight of hand,” as opposed to direct bribes, accounted for 
most of the corrupt smuggling between Hong Kong and China.85   
These examples, although seemingly small and insignificant, help explain how 
various forms of corruption can be identified and measured in specific institutional or 
geographical situations.  These methods are helpful for identifying specific problems and 
instituting reforms, but they do little to tell us how corruption levels compare across 
countries, regions, or even the globe.  For that we must analyze the most widely-cited 
corruption measurement, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (see 
part III.B., infra).  But before turning to that, I will first attempt to answer a question that 
may seem self-explanatory: what makes corruption “bad”? 
D.  CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION  
 Corruption is generally considered a detrimental, if inevitable, aspect of society.  
While there is still much debate about the causes of and possible solutions to corruption-
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plagued nations, few scholars or policy makers argue against reforming corrupt 
institutions.  Some political scientists and development scholars once argued that 
corruption is not inherently negative and that in certain situations it may be preferable to 
alternatives or even the status quo.86  In some cases this argument was justified on 
grounds of economic or political efficiency.  For example, Huntington stated that “[i]n 
terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-
centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest 
bureaucracy.”87  His point is that in some developing countries corruption actually 
greases the wheels of an otherwise inefficient economy, which in turn leads to much 
needed economic growth.  This was generally argued about poor, developing countries in 
which the national governments exercised a (presumably too-) large amount of control 
over the economies.  Similarly, Rose-Ackerman states that “individual bribes sometimes 
not only benefit the payer and the recipient but also enhance overall efficiency or 
fairness,” especially in countries with extensive, inefficient, and arbitrary regulatory 
systems.88   
Other scholars hesitate to argue that corruption is beneficial yet still resist the 
“natural but wrong [assumption] that the results of corruption are always both bad and 
important.”89  This critique resists the moralistic perspective on corruption while instead 
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focusing specifically on outcomes.  Although these perspectives have not completely 
subsided – some authors still point to the high levels of corruption experienced through 
the growth of the Asian Tigers as proof that corruption and growth can work hand-in-
hand90 – the overwhelming consensus among corruption scholars is the opposite.  Despite 
whatever positive effects it may have in certain cases, corruption is inimical to the 
development and legitimacy of a state.91  I believe that this argument holds because the 
negative effects of corruption regularly outweigh any supposed short-term benefits of 
individual corrupt actions. 
 The consensus that corruption is bad is based upon the belief that corruption 
limits economic and political growth, increases poverty and violence, and in extreme 
cases can lead to the dissolution of a state.  From an economic and development 
perspective, this argument is relatively straightforward.  Corruption inhibits economic 
growth in several ways simultaneously, and these consequences are particularly acute in 
poor, developing nations.  First, it siphons money otherwise meant for much needed 
development projects into the pockets of individuals that, arguably, do not need or 
deserve it.  By definition, rents (or bribes, embezzlement, fraud, etc.) remove wealth from 
an economy without adding a productive capacity.  Corruption-prone governments tend 
to pursue small numbers of large, often inefficient infrastructure projects – as opposed to 
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small-scale or human-centered development projects – because it is easier to seek rents 
and channel contracts to cronies at this level.92   
Second, corruption reduces the impact of domestic or international development 
aid efforts, such as building schools, roads, or hospitals, which further inhibits a countries 
chance for future growth.  When aid projects fail to deliver on promised returns due to 
corruption, public support for international aid diminishes.  Furthermore, a poor ranking 
on a global corruption index can inhibit a country’s ability to receive development aid in 
the first place, which in turn reduces a government’s chance of receiving the resources it 
may need to complete anti-corruption reforms. 
Third, corruption distorts the principles of supply and demand and offers 
incentives for businesses to bribe rather than produce the best product or service for the 
lowest price.  This disincentives entrepreneurial activity and reduces talent levels and 
product quality within related industries.93 In an increasingly globalized world where 
international trade is necessary for most countries, this seemingly minor distortion can 
have huge ripple effects throughout a local or national economy.   
Fourth, corruption encourages capital flight because individuals who 
misappropriate or steal government funds will undoubtedly wish to store those funds 
outside the reach of their respective government agencies.  One need only look at the 
Parisian apartments owned by members of African governing families, or the numerous 
estates in Florida owned by ex-Latin American military officials to understand how this 
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manifests in certain circumstances.  This is especially problematic in developing 
countries with high levels of valuable natural resources and/or civil conflict.94  
Finally, foreign investment is discouraged when corruption is perceived as 
systemic.95  Although some international businesses have until recently been quite willing 
and able to pay bribes to pursue international projects,96 corruption increases uncertainty 
and presents complicated public relations (and at times legal) challenges for multinational 
corporations.  If a nation’s legal system is perceived as weak, unfair, or unreliable, 
outside investors will hesitate to bring resources and jobs to a developing country in fear 
that law will not protect their investments.  These problems overlap and reinforce 
themselves, which repeats a cycle of poverty97 through inefficient resource production 
and distribution at all levels of the economy.  These problems multiply in effect because 
“corruption is regressive.  It hurts the poorest and most marginalized sectors of society” 
as it is precisely those most in need who cannot afford to access resources through 
corrupt channels.98  That being said, this perspective assumes that foreign investment is 
beneficial to those most in need.  Although it is beyond the scope of this section, there is 
arguably as much – or perhaps more – corruption in the inequitable nature of the global 
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economic system, something that few anti-corruption organizations take into 
consideration.   
When corruption reaches a systemic level it also undermines public trust of, and 
support for, government, which inhibits institutional growth at all levels.99  Lack of faith 
in government limits civic engagement and participation, precisely the tools needed to 
ensure that corruption does not run rampant.  Especially for developing countries with 
high levels of poverty, these consequences combine to create high levels of inequality 
and low-levels of trust, which increases the chances of corruption and violence across 
society.  Citizens who may otherwise trust the government to provide resources will turn 
elsewhere for support (which often strengthens organized crime or other illicit networks), 
while those that would generally fear punishment will more regularly break the law to get 
what they need.  Uslaner names this self-reinforcing cycle the “inequality trap”.  He 
argues that although you “can have plenty of corruption without inequality,” corruption 
and inequality are connected at least because “people perceive of a link between 
inequality and corruption.”100  This is so because our actions reflect not only our own 
beliefs and desires but also how also how we believe that others will act.  In this sense, 
even incorrect perceptions of rampant government corruption can reinforce that very 
same behavior and become self-fulfilling (this will be discussed further in Section IIIa, 
infra).101  If your family and community is poor, and you believe – rightly or wrongly – 
that government officials are milking the state coffers at your expense, there is little 
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incentive to keep you from breaking the law to get what you need.  This can also push 
otherwise honest people into collusion with organized crime, separatist rebels, or even 
terrorist organizations in an effort to satisfy basic needs and resist what they see as 
corrupt governments.102  In this way extensive corruption reduces support for popular 
participation in government103 because it “breeds cynicism, criminality, and distrust.”104  
This is but one reason why some organizations and individual scholars argue that the 
“war on terror” would be better fought through economic development and institutional 
reform in regions responsible for high levels of terrorist recruits.105   
 Although the aforementioned consequences of corruption are well documented, 
proving causation remains difficult for various reasons.  First, defining and measuring 
corruption is extremely complicated, as discussed above.  Similarly, many authors have 
highlighted how the ideologies of certain anti-corruption organizations or individual 
scholars have caused them to stress corruption as “both effect and cause of incomplete, 
uneven, or ineffective economic liberalization.”106  By emphasizing corruption’s role in 
government with illiberal economic structures these “experts” have (explicitly or 
implicitly) equated the implementation of neoliberal policies with the eradication of 
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corruption.  For some, this perspective is both problematic and self-serving.107  For 
others, it is simply incorrect because corruption tends to increase during the transition 
from state-based to a free-market economies.  Nonetheless, this perspective has provided 
the foundation for many anti-corruption programs at the national and international level. 
E.  COMBATING CORRUPTION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS 
 
 Corruption is, it would appear, one of the great evils of our time.  
Citizens are appalled by it, international organizations have created reform 
agendas to tackle it and politicians earnestly claim to want to reduce it.  
Even the world of business has embraced the notion that it could well be 
in its interests to work alongside regulators and policy-makers with a view 
to cleaning up the environment where trade takes place . . .. Working to 
reduce the underlying negative effects of corruption therefore seems to be 
very much the order of the day.108 
 
 Combating corruption is incredibly complicated.  This is due in part to the 
problems raised above (e.g. varying definitions, complications in measurement, etc.) but 
also because of the uniquely political nature of corrupt acts.  Any attempt to reduce 
corruption must involve the creation and enforcement of legal and administrative 
procedures that help prevent and deter corruption while also providing clear punishments 
for those who commit corrupt acts.  However, decades of “one-size-fits-all” anti-
corruption efforts have shown that it requires more than copying and implementing 
“essentially technical solutions . . . [such as] particular types of [neoliberal] economic 
policies and/or institutional reforms.”109  But corruption is not simply about economics, it 
is an interdisciplinary problem that often involves powerful actors with diverse interests.   
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The efficacy of institutional reform is further limited when corruption becomes 
systemic, and attempting to punish the corrupt is not only difficult but often dangerous.110  
Nonetheless, tales of corrupt officials evoke strong emotions from the public, and thus 
promises to “eradicate corruption” are common cries during any election season.111  Dan 
Hough and many other scholars make clear that, despite the difficulty involved, anti-
corruption and “good governance” efforts have in a few decades grown from “the dog 
that can barely raise a wimper”112 to the centerpiece of domestic, regional, and 
international policy agendas.  This growth is in part because the rise of investigative 
journalism and the advent of social media have left few places for corrupt leaders to hide.  
The World Bank, a key leader in the international “good-governance” movement, states 
that although media can be used to simply prop up the already powerful, a strong and 
independent media is one of the “two most important factors in eliminating systemic 
corruption in public institutions.”113  But, as will be discussed below, even an 
independent media cannot combat corruption in the long term.  This is because fighting 
corruption is as complex as defining the term, especially in countries facing systemic 
corruption.  Combating systemic corruption 
 “requires active participation and a long-term commitment by a 
variety of anti-corruption actors such as national government leaders; civil 
society, media (journalists), academics, the private sector and international 
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organizations.  However, the political will of national governments should 
be in the front line in the fight against these social norms.”114  
 
For most of human history, anti-corruption efforts consisted simply of ad hoc 
investigations created to determine whether an individual, group, or political party (for 
example) had violated the law in one of any number of ways.115  These investigations 
generally arose amid public outcry and political pressure over a specific scandal or crisis 
that was (often) first made public by the media or opposition politicians.  Yet as with any 
anti-corruption efforts, individual investigations tend to be extremely political and the 
results can vary; sometimes laws or administrative guidelines are created, changed, or 
strengthened in hopes that another scandal will not ensue; sometimes individual corrupt 
officials are removed from office, fined, sent to jail, or even forced to flee the country;116 
sometimes entire agencies or state institutions are emptied and re-filled with new, 
supposedly corruption free staff. 
Although ad hoc anti-corruption investigations are still common in many parts of 
the world the vast majority of anti-corruption initiatives today involve more permanent 
efforts created to address a wide range of people, institutions, and behaviors.  There are 
three broad mechanisms by which these anti-corruption efforts are pursued: International 
(or regional) anti-corruption treaties; domestic anti-corruption statutes that sometimes 
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have reach beyond one state’s borders; and domestic or regional anti-corruption agencies 
(ACAs).  Within these three mechanisms many variations exist.   
The broadest and yet arguably least effective anti-corruption mechanisms exist at 
the international level.  There are several regional or multi-lateral treaties that attempt to 
address corruption from an international legal perspective, the most important of which 
are (in chronological order): the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter American 
Convention Against Corruption (1996), the OECD International Convention on 
Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (1997), the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003), and the 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2010).  Although 
these treaties are important parts of the international anti-corruption movement, beyond 
standardization of language or publicity of communal intentions they have represented, at 
best, symbolic improvements.  There are also anti-terrorism or anti-money laundering 
treaties that involve some specific anti-corruption initiatives, though these treaties tend to 
focus on specific types of corruption committed by specific individuals in a narrow set of 
circumstances.117  Furthermore, the practical effects of these efforts are small because the 
UN and other international agencies “do not have the tools to enforce (or even monitor) 
its own anti-corruption efforts.”118   
Another powerful yet relatively rare anti-corruption initiative involves creating 
domestic anti-corruption laws that govern the behavior of a country’s citizens and 
corporations when they operate internationally.  The purpose of these statutes is to limit 
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the supply-side of corrupt acts, i.e. to prevent and punish those who bribe government 
officials.  Due to jurisdictional constraints, these laws only apply to individual citizens or 
corporations whose charter is in the state where the act was passed.  Nonetheless, these 
laws are can have an incredible impact for multiple reasons: they inhibit the practices of 
private individuals who are often otherwise immune from anti-corruption laws in some 
states (i.e. receiving a bribe is almost always illegal, but offering one is often not); they 
influence the behavior of powerful multinational corporations, including those whose 
annual revenue may be more than the GDP of the countries they do business in, and; 
corrupt behavior is punished outside the normal political constraints of the country where 
the act occurs (i.e. the corrupt actor is punished not in the country where the bribe took 
place – which, for obvious reasons, rarely happens – but in the state where the briber 
lives and works).   
The most famous and controversial example of these laws is the 1979 U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).  The FCPA prohibits any representative, agent, or 
employee of publically held companies from bribing, or offering or promising to bribe,119 
a foreign government official in furtherance of interstate commerce.  The FCPA is 
limited in that it only applies to specific individuals representing specific types of U.S.-
based companies, and it only limits their ability to bribe foreign government officials; 
private individuals can act corruptly towards other private individuals or businesses 
without running afoul of the law.  Similarly, the FCPA does not limit all transfers of cash 
or gifts; so-called “grease payments” are still allowed so long as they are considered 
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“routine government actions” and are not illegal in the state where they occurred.120  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the FCPA has significant potential to limit some forms 
of corruption.  Considering the international reach and influence that many U.S.-based 
corporations have, and also considering that many “corrupt” countries lack the ability or 
will to enforce their own anti-corruption laws, the FCPA and other laws like it provide an 
alternate route for punishing individuals who otherwise break the law with impunity.   
In recent decades the trend within the anti-corruption movement has been towards 
creating domestic anti-corruption agencies, or ACAs (sometimes also referred to 
“National Integrity Systems”).  Broadly speaking, the goal of these agencies is to 
coordinate the detection, prevention, and to a lesser extent punishment of corruption in 
any number of institutions.  According to Patrick Meagher, the success of two initial anti-
corruption agencies in Hong Kong (the ICAC, created in the 1950s) and Singapore 
(CPIB, created in the 1970s) “provided the impetus, and paradigm, for the establishment 
of strong, centralized agencies” dedicated to fighting corruption at the domestic level.121  
The structure, composition, and mandate of these agencies can vary widely depending on 
many factors, including the form of government, political will, amount and quality of 
resources available, strength of otherwise complimentary institutions, role of 
international agencies, etc.  Nonetheless, ACAs can be broadly divided into two general 
formats: single-agency approaches and multiple-agency approaches.   
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The single agency paradigm, as seen in Hong Kong and Singapore, “places a 
number of key capabilities, responsibilities, and resources under one roof” in the hopes of 
creating a single, powerful government institution that can address many facets of anti-
corruption work.122  These agencies must still interact with other parts of the government 
(e.g. the legislature to seek funding, the prosecutors or the courts to pursue criminal 
charges, etc.), but the vast majority of their work can be completed internally.  These 
agencies are often composed of staff with diverse training and professional backgrounds, 
which sometimes involves pulling individual government officials (forensic accountants, 
prosecutors, etc.) from other sectors of the government and private sector to work 
together.   
Single agency mechanisms are ambitious but necessary approaches to combating 
corruption, especially in cases where there is a crisis of legitimacy or where corruption 
remains particularly entrenched in powerful institutions.  For example, Hong Kong’s 
ICAC was created as an independent agency precisely because neither the Governor nor 
the public had faith in the police’s ability to monitor or disrupt entrenched corruption 
networks that had flourished in the 1960s and early 1970s.123  Public perceptions are 
important not just for defining and understanding the problem but also with respect to 
creating effective anti-corruption strategies; if the public has no faith in the ACA, or 
remains fearful of the “corrupt” institution being investigated, progress is limited from 
the outset.  This highlights how difficult it is to battle entrenched corruption because, as 
Uslaner argues, corruption is “sticky,” i.e. it relates to patterns of behavior that are self-
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reinforcing and hard to change.124  Corruption thrives in environments of fear and 
distrust, when (both corrupt and clean) institutions are perceived as unfair and 
illegitimate.  In these cases it is necessary to create an independent institution that can 
address all the complex pieces of prevention, detection, and punishment.  For these 
reasons single-agency models are common in countries that have faced significant 
corruption crises that affected – or were perceived to have affected – multiple 
government institutions at all levels.125  The downside to single agency regimes is that 
they are often destined to fail in precisely the situations where they are needed; in 
countries confronting systemic corruption, “new institutional reforms and procedures – 
like the ones they replace, in many instances – are often deprived of the administrative 
and political support and underlying normative consensus that they require for 
success.”126  Therefore, single agency approaches tend to create a catch-22 scenario: if 
the agency pursues short-term investigations and administrative reforms the effect will be 
short lived for lack of public or political will, yet if they flex their muscles too much they 
risk destroying the entire regime or, perhaps more commonly, their own agency in the 
process.  
Multiple-agency approaches, on the other hand, are more common when 
corruption is not perceived as severe enough to de-legitimize an entire government or 
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institution.  In many situations, a scandal may have exposed institutional weaknesses, but 
“the depth of the crisis is insufficient to support a more robust centralization of anti-
corruption functions.”127  In this approach traditional agencies often keep their 
responsibilities and jurisdictions yet are supplemented with new anti-corruption programs 
meant to address gaps in the existing structure that create opportunities for corruption.  
These “fragmented approaches” move beyond the short-term, ad hoc investigations of 
earlier times yet do not require the same level of resources, autonomy and publicity as 
single agency approaches; examples include the US Office of Governmental Ethics and 
similar agencies in Britain, France, India, and Mexico, to name just a few.128   
Regardless of institutional structure, ACAs are limited in the work they can 
pursue.  Even if resources abound (which is rare) and political will is high (common but 
not long-lasting), structural constraints keep ACAs from acting as truly independent 
investigative bodies.  However, in both single and multi-agency approaches, ACAs tend 
to emphasize several concrete tasks that focus on prevention and deterrence: 1) receive 
and respond to complaints; 2) Intelligence, monitoring, and investigation (and 
coordination of other corruption-related intelligence and investigations from other 
institutions); 3) Preventative research, analysis, and technical assistance; 4) Ethics policy 
guidance, compliance review, and scrutiny of asset declarations; 5) Public information, 
education, and outreach; 6) Orientation of social equilibrium away from bribery and other 
corrupt practices.129  In theory, the combination of these tasks could create a robust anti-
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corruption agency capable of turning the tide against even entrenched corruption.  In 
practice, however, this is often not the case; limited resources, narrow mandates, shifting 
political wills, and violence and intimidation are but a few of the reasons that even 
popular and well-functioning ACAs have limited success (see case studies of El Salvador 
and Pakistan, below).  Some ACAs also have the power to prosecute individuals or issue 
administrative orders in response to their investigations, but in many cases (e.g. 
Pakistan’s NAB) the ACA must partner with the courts and prosecutors and thus must 
rely on the political will and resources of other possibly corrupt government institutions. 
Many anti-corruption initiatives, whether international treaties or the creation of 
domestic ACAs, also suffer from “questions of external intervention and the geopolitics 
of North-South relations.”130  This is because combating systemic corruption – however 
one defines it – involves normative shifts not only within state institutions but also within 
the perceived relationship between a government and its citizens.  This type of “societal 
engineering,” as Amitaz Etzioni argues, is particularly difficult when “the change agent is 
a foreign power.”131  Nonetheless, international aid agencies have become the lead 
players in anti-corruption efforts precisely because the countries or regions that suffer the 
most from corruption have the least ability – whether due to lack of resources, technical 
skill, or political will - to change the problem from within.  For all the fanfare, global 
anti-corruption efforts (sometimes referred to derogatorily as the “anti-corruption 
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industry”132) are often critiqued alongside other development efforts as neo-colonial, 
imperialist, or simply ethnocentric and biased.133   
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CHAPTER III  
ARGUMENT 
Corruption is an extremely sensitive problem in most countries.  As discussed 
above, it is incredibly hard to define, measure, and combat.  Transparency International 
(TI), the first and perhaps most important international anti-corruption organization, has 
led the way in the development of corruption-related research, methodological tools, and 
advocacy.  Through the development and dissemination of reports such as the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), Transparency International has brought the corruption debate to 
the forefront of international law and development discussions.  Good governance and 
anti-corruption reform, once side-notes to policy discussions, are now regularly included 
as parts of international and bi-lateral development programs.  While I argue that the CPI 
has some major flaws in methodology and in the types of corruption it focuses on (see 
Part IIIa, infra), it must be seen as widely successful in bringing corruption to the 
forefront of discussions within international organizations, multi-national corporations, 
and governments in all parts of the world.  It would be hard to argue that the 1997 OECD 
International Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions or the 2003 United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption were not directly related to the research and publicity that TI is responsible 
for instigating.  This was a positive step for the anti-corruption movement, yet it is also 
representative of how the entire anti-corruption agenda is built on a shaky and overly 
simplistic foundation.   
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A. WHAT THE DOMINANT PERSPECTIVE IS LACKING 
I argue that the focus of corruption as an economic problem is not only self-
serving for Western institutions such as the World Bank and IMF but also that it allows 
the international community in general to ignore the serious role that corruption plays as 
a barrier to the rule of law.  If corruption is simply seen as economic in nature, as a ‘hole 
in the bucket’ of otherwise productive development or economic policies, there will 
undoubtedly be less of a commitment by outsiders - and, I argue, average citizens - to 
pursue and honestly address the nature of the problem.  This is analogous to the 
difference between citizens’ perceptions and attitudes towards the crimes of shoplifting 
and assault: while we all may agree on an intellectual level that shoplifting is bad for 
society, that stores or corporations do not absorb the costs of shoplifting but instead pass 
them on to their customers and the general public, etc., few of us would ever spend our 
own time or money to address the issue of shoplifting in our communities.  But assault is 
on another level, and when violence becomes pervasive in our societies we quickly work 
to the extent that we can to root out its causes and pressure our leaders to implement 
solutions.  Until corruption is viewed in this context, as an integral cause and effect of 
violence and disorder in society, the average citizen may continue to complain about the 
corrupt bureaucrats who run their government but too often they will become apathetic, 
learn to tolerate this behavior, or perhaps even attempt to benefit from it.  Corruption will 
become the norm, it will permeate all interactions and transactions between the public 
and private sectors, and it will eventually look less like an abstract problem and more like 
the lifeblood running through (and at times keeping alive) domestic and international 
institutions.  In some societies this is already the case. 
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Misguided approaches lead to flawed research methodologies and an emphasis on 
the wrong data; this in turn leads to a misunderstanding of the causes and consequences 
of the problem, which later leads to ineffective or unrealistic laws and anti-corruption 
institutions.  This is the problem with the CPI and other measurements that follow the 
dominant perspective.  I am not arguing that measuring perceptions is the wrong model – 
corruption is incredibly hard to measure in any form.  Rather I argue that if we measure 
perceptions we cannot simply focus on the perceptions of elites (businessmen, academics, 
and policy makers) because this will necessarily skew the results and lead to the creation 
of laws that simply benefit those elites by combating the corruption they are most 
concerned about (e.g. by creating anti-corruption agencies designed as asset recovery 
tools).  This is especially problematic if countries are ranked based on the perceptions of 
foreigners; if corruption is so detrimental to the daily lives of Salvadorans and Pakistanis, 
for example, we should be measuring their perceptions of the extent of corruption in the 
Salvadoran or Pakistani government.  Instead, reports like the CPI measure the 
perceptions of local and foreign elites who have different interests than the public, and 
then use those perceptions to rally support among the masses for policy changes that 
ultimately will not affect their daily lives.  In this sense surveys like the CPI may actually 
create misperceptions as to the actual level and extent of corruption in any one society.  
Granted, new efforts have been made by Transparency International and other institutions 
to measure public perceptions of corruption, yet these reports often take a backseat to the 
widely disseminated CPI.134 
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Scholars and policy-makers that attempt to study corruption often do so because 
corruption is seen as detrimental to economic development, state legitimacy, violence and 
the rule of law.135  Yet the framework they use, including the reliance on reports such as 
the CPI, is misguided and needs to be reformed.136  I argue that the current CPI 
methodology does far more to shape perceptions and reinforce stereotypes within and 
across populations than it does to promote a uniform understanding of pre-existing 
perceptions about corruption in various countries.  Thus, it is not surprising that the anti-
corruption agencies created in the late 1990s and early 2000s are already receiving 
criticism for lack of effect (e.g. NAB in Pakistan).137  Misguided laws or legal institutions 
lead to unimpressive results and often-unexpected negative effects.  The following 
analysis of the CPI highlights how the dominant perspective manifests in a specific, 
widely cited international corruption index.  The effects of this misguided approach show 
why it is necessary that corruption scholars and policy makers that continue to promote 
the dominant perspective come to understand the limitations of this approach.   
B. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL & THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 
 
Transparency International (TI) is an international non-governmental organization 
(NGO) committed to creating “a world in which government, business, civil society and 
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the daily lives of people are free of corruption.”138  The organization was founded in 1993 
by Peter Eigen, a retired World Bank official, and several of his “allies”.  They believed 
that a lack of transparency and high levels of corruption were significant causes of 
economic and political underdevelopment throughout the world.  Although corruption 
stories were regularly in the news at this time, especially those related to legendary heads 
of state like Ferdinand Marcos, as a policy issue it was still considered a “taboo” subject.  
According to TI’s website, the founders of the organizations were trying to change what 
they saw as a pervasive belief: “international agencies were consigned to the fact that 
corruption would sap funding from many development projects around the world” yet 
they did little to address it directly.139  Mr. Eigen and his partners thus set out to change 
this fatalistic outlook by first designing a way to study corruption across countries, and 
then by turning their research into global advocacy and policy prescriptions that could be 
implemented at the national and international level. 
i.  Organizational Structure 
The TI Secretariat, which “provides leadership for the movement’s international 
initiatives,” is based in Berlin.140  This is the nerve center of the organization.  Through 
their Berlin office, TI works to build coalitions with regional and international 
organizations (e.g. the UN, OECD, OAS, ASEAN, etc.) that either already have anti-
corruption platforms or would benefit from implementing them.  It also provides support 
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and oversight for the individual TI chapters, which is where the country-specific research, 
domestic policy reforms, and local advocacy takes place.  TI describes this relationship as 
one of “mutual support”, and the intention is that the Secretariat provides administrative 
support and global expertise while the chapters provide nuanced, creative, and country or 
culture-specific information that may benefit the organization as a whole (or other 
chapters).  Local chapters are present on every continent, although due to various local 
problems (violence or civil conflict, failing or nonexistent infrastructure, lack of local 
support, etc.) large gaps still exist in Africa.141  The organization is overseen by a board 
of directors who are mostly academics and bureaucrats who have decades of experience 
in international organizations.142  It also has an advisory council that consists of anti-
corruption experts who are chosen by the Board of Directors, along with a list of 
individual members who voluntarily chose to be part of the organization.143  Each of 
these organizational components is meant to provide expertise and support to the local 
and international efforts of the organization.  The individual members and the 
representatives from the local chapters vote at the Annual Membership Meeting.144 
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Although TI was initially focused as a research organization, it now has chapters 
in 100 countries and “works relentlessly to stir the world’s collective conscience and 
bring about change” with respect to corruption.145  Other than the Corruption Perceptions 
Index, the organization creates topical, country-by-country, and region-specific 
corruption reports on an annual and semi-annual basis; publishes articles and policy 
papers in relevant academic journals; provides consulting to governments, international 
development organizations, and NGOs that have transparency and anti-corruption 
programs; is involved in organizing the annual International Anti-Corruption Conference 
(IACC); and completes other related research and advocacy work around the globe. It is 
also regularly cited in national and international media.146  While many scholars critique 
specific policies and methodologies employed by Transparency International, most 
everyone in the anti-corruption field recognizes the way TI has dramatically changed the 
global corruption debate.147  For example, by 1996 corruption had already become a 
major policy issue: the President of the World Bank spoke openly of the “cancer of 
corruption” and made anti-corruption reform a condition for assistance; the OECD 
adopted formal policies for criminalizing bribery; and the Organization of American 
States (OAS) adopted the first regional anti-corruption convention. 
 
 
                                                
145 “Our Organization: Accountability,” Transparency International, Accessed April 9, 2014, 
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/accountability. 
 
146 For example, The New York Times cited or directly referenced Transparency International 
1,770 times over a 12-month period (search conducted May 12, 2014). 
 
147 Brown and Cloke, “Neoliberal Reform, Governance and Corruption in the South: Assessing the 
International Anti-Corruption Crusade,” 273-294; See also, Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of 
Law, 12-14. 
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ii.  Presentation of the Report  
The CPI is presented in a colorful yet simple eight-page brochure that is available 
online and in print.148  Despite the fact that the report represents an incredible amount of 
data, and that its results have direct and indirect effects on domestic legislation, 
international treaties, and tens of millions of dollars of development aid, the report itself 
has barely any text.  The cover and back page account for 25% of the brochure, and 
another 50% consists of two different visual representations of the data: pages four and 
five list the rankings of the 177 countries and include a world map where each country’s 
score is represented by a corresponding color scheme that has shades from yellow (scores 
close to 100, or “very clean”) to dark red (scores close to 0, or “very corrupt”); page six 
uses the same color scheme but groups the names of countries around a circle made out 
of the color that corresponds with their ranking; Page seven has horizontal bars that 
represent regions of the world, and each bar is divided into rectangles of the different 
colors whose width corresponds with the number of countries in that region that rank in 
each color scheme.  Page seven also has three paragraphs of text explaining how to read 
the info graphics on pages four through seven.  Page eight is the back cover.   
This simplistic style is arguably meant to make the data accessible and digestible 
to the general public, and in this way it may be much preferred to the dense and 
complicated structure of many development reports.  However, the simplicity masks two 
important issues: 1 – corruption is extremely complex, and its definitions and 
consequences vary considerably depending on context, geography, and culture, and; 2 – 
the data being presented to the general public about perceptions of corruption in their 
                                                
148 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013: Results,” Transparency International, Accessed April 4, 
2014, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results. 
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country is not gathered from the general public, but rather from “sophisticated” elites 
who may have a very different understanding of the problem than the general public (i.e. 
the supposed audience) actually has. 
The bulk of the text consists of four paragraphs on page three that attempt to 
define the problem of corruption and outline the importance of the CPI report in 
combating that problem.  The language is presented as a concise call to action, on behalf 
of the citizens of each nation, to combat a concrete problem that “we all know” leads to 
“clear” results: corruption “undermine[s] justice and economic development, and 
destroys public trust in leaders.”  In an attempt to highlight the over simplistic yet 
dramatic nature of the report, I will reproduce that text in its entirety: 
“From children denied an education, to elections decided by money not 
votes, public sector corruption comes in many forms.  Bribes and 
backroom deals don’t just steal resources from the most vulnerable – they 
undermine justice and economic development, and destroy public trust in 
leaders.  
  
But while the results of corruption are clear, the real extent of the problem 
is harder to pin down.  Corruption is shadowy and secretive by nature.  We 
all know corruption is a problem, but how bad is it, and what can be done?   
 
This is where the Corruption Perceptions Index comes in.  Based on expert 
opinion, the index measures the perceived levels of public sector 
corruption in countries worldwide, scoring them from 0 (highly corrupt) to 
100 (very clean).  Covering 177 countries, the 2013 index paints a 
worrying picture.  While a handful perform well, not one single country 
gets a perfect score.  More than two-thirds score less than 50.   
 
The need for greater accountability is clear, and leaders cannot look the 
other way.  But recognizing the problem is only the first step – 
governments need to turn pledges into actions.  All citizens deserve bribe-
free services, and leaders that are answerable to the public, not to powerful 
friends.  Working together, we can make this a reality.”149 
 
                                                
149 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013,” Transparency International, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/#myAnchor2 (last visited May 12, 2014), 3. 
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This language presents an overly simplistic version of a complex problem that the 
authors themselves admit is “shadowy and secretive in nature.”  As stated above, this is 
likely related to questions of accessibility.  However, by masking the complexity of the 
problem in clearly action-oriented language the report becomes more of a political slogan 
than a credible, independent analysis of research.  It clearly states that corruption, and 
any attempt to measure its extent, is a significant challenge for the world.  But then it 
quickly offers a solution to that problem: the numerical results listed on the following 
four pages.  It does not explain how the results are tabulated, yet insists that the rankings 
are based on “expert” opinion.  It does not explain what needs to be done.  It does not 
explain how this data can, will, or even should be used, other than saying that “leaders 
cannot look the other way.”  But it does do one very obvious thing: it tells every person 
who glances at its pages how corrupt each country’s government is through simple, eye-
catching infographics.  It purports to give a clear, precise picture of where in the world 
corruption flourishes.  This allows any reader the ability to judge his or her own country 
in comparison to its friends, its enemies, and its neighbors.   
Not surprisingly, the countries represented by major international aid 
organizations are noticeably light (yellow) and clean and in clear contrast to the corrupt, 
dark red countries of the developing world.  This oversimplification would be 
problematic even if the data was based on public opinion in each of these “corrupt” 
countries, but it becomes even more troublesome when it is based on the opinions of 
elites who live, work, or regularly travel through the modern, developed, “clean” 
countries of the global north.  This reinforces a paradigm focused on Western notions of 
economic progress and modernity, which in tern strengthens distinctions between “us” 
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and “them”; Just as early development indicators “taught” many people in the third world 
how poor and underdeveloped they really were, this report quickly and simplistically 
“teaches” the Pakistani, Salvadoran, or Russian public how corrupt their government 
actually is.  This assumes, of course, that the public does not have or cannot come to their 
own informed opinions about the extent – let alone the causes and consequences – of 
corruption in their own country. 
iii.  Methodology of the CPI 
The Corruption Perceptions Index was the first global corruption index and today 
it remains, arguably, the most widely recognized corruption index in the world.  The 
inaugural report was published in 1995 and consisted of 45 countries ranked according to 
their perceived level of public sector corruption.  It has since been published on an annual 
basis and the most recent report (2013) included 177 countries.  Despite critiques saying 
otherwise, TI’s goal was that the country-specific data could be measured in relation to 
other countries during the same year and in relation to the same country in previous 
years.  However, large, hard-to-explain fluctuations from year to year caused many 
scholars and policy makers to argue that even if the methodology was sound it was an 
inaccurate tool for measuring how perceptions improve or worsen over time.  Due in part 
to these critiques (outlined further below), Transparency International went through an 
intense internal and external review of its methodology in 2011.  This review led to a 
series of changes to the methodology.150  Since updating the methodology in 2012, the 
                                                
150 For time and space purposes, I will not outline the pre-2012 methodology in this paper.  It is 
important to note that some of the critiques raised by other scholars over the last 15 years may be mitigated 
or even done away with due to the 2012 methodology; it is simply too early to tell.  I argue that my general 
critique, on the other hand, has not been addressed by the changes to the methodology.  See, “Corruption 
Perceptions Index – An Updated Methodology for 2012,” Transparency International, Accessed April 6, 
2014, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/2012_CPIUpdatedMethodology_EMBARGO_EN.pdf.  
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report gives countries a score ranging from 0-100; a country with a score of 0 is 
perceived as highly corrupt, while a country with a score closer to 100 is perceived as 
largely free from corruption.  Countries are then ranked according to how their scores 
compare to other country’s scores for that same year.  The data sources vary from year to 
year and the methodology is quite complicated.151   
The CPI is an aggregate index that draws on multiple data sources.  TI draws on 
data from independent institutions that measure the perceptions of corruption in countries 
over the two years prior to the release of the report.  Each data source must satisfy four 
specific criteria.  The data source must:152  
1. Be a measurement of perceptions of corruption in the public sector 
2. Be based on a reliable and valid methodology, which scores and ranks 
multiple countries on the same scale 
3. Be performed by a credible institution and expected to be repeated regularly 
4. Allow for sufficient variation of scores to distinguish between countries 
 
The 2013 CPI used 13 data sources, including, for example, the African 
Development Bank Governance Indicators 2012, the Economist Intelligence Unit 
Country Risk Ratings, the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
2012, and the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2013.153  For any country to be 
included in the index, a minimum of 3 data sources must assess the country.  Once the 
sources have been chosen and the data for each country compiled, Transparency 
                                                                                                                                            
 
151 “Corruption Perceptions Index: In Detail,” Transparency International, Accessed May 11, 
2014, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/in_detail/. 
 
152 “2012 Methodology Short Note,” Transparency International, Accessed April 6, 2014, 
www.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/2012_CPIShortMethodologyNote_EMBARGO_EN.pdf. 
 
153 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013: Full Source Description,” Transparency International, 
Accessed March 31, 2014, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/in_detail/#myAnchor4. 
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International standardizes the data154, calculates an average of all the country’s 
standardized scores, and reports a measure of uncertainty.155 
The CPI measures perceptions of public sector corruption through surveys of 
citizens and international actors who work with the individual government(s) in question.  
The focus is therefore on business people, academics, development organizations, and 
regional or international actors who arguably have a more nuanced perspective of the 
extent and type of corruption in the public sector; corruption related to private businesses 
or criminal organizations is not measured.  The individuals who are surveyed are often 
well-traveled and educated, which (in theory) allows them to compare how they perceive 
of corruption in one country as opposed to others in the same region, on the same 
continent, or across the globe.  This does, however, emphasize the perceptions of the 
local and global elite, a point that is the foundation of many of the methodological 
critiques discussed below. 
iv.  Standard Critiques of the Methodology 
 The main critiques of the CPI methodology are as follows: 
• The measures are imprecise and unreliable.156  Scholars who make this critique 
focus on the limited and focused number of research subjects (i.e. the elite in the 
                                                
154 “2012 Methodology Short Note,” Transparency International, 1, Accessed April 6, 2014, 
www.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/2012_CPIShortMethodologyNote_EMBARGO_EN.pdf, 
(Scores for each country are standardized by “subtracting the mean of the data set and dividing by the 
standard deviation and results in Z-scores, which are then adjusted to have a mean of approximately 45 and 
a standard deviation of approximately 20 so that the data set fits the CPI’s 0-100 scale”).   
 
155 “2012 Methodology Short Note,” Transparency International, 1, Accessed April 6, 2014, 
www.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/2012_CPIShortMethodologyNote_EMBARGO_EN.pdf,(
“The CPI is accompanied by a standard error and confidence interval associated with the score, which 
capture the variation in scores of the data sources available for that country/territory.”)  
 
156 This is the most widely cited critique, which applies to both the CPI and the other noteworthy 
corruption index, the World Bank Governance Indicators.  See Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the 
Rule of Law, 11-12.  See also, Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The World Bank 
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country and international actors) and the fact that some countries have more 
indicators than others. This imprecision is particularly inaccurate for the poorest 
countries as many of the sources are foreign actors or wealthy expatriates.  This 
issue may have been resolved by the updated 2012 methodology, although the 
jury is still out on that. 
• Country rankings vary widely from one year to the next, which makes it 
unsuitable for tracking changes over time.157 
• The CPI focuses on the public sector, which emphasizes the conduct (and thus the 
blame) of the bribe-recipients, not the corporate or international actors who bribe 
them.  TI has, however, responded to this criticism both by expanding some of the 
data sources and creating other corruption reports that help tell the overall picture 
for corruption in a country.158 
• The aggregate numbers provided often fail to correlate with local corruption 
perception studies undertaken by media outlets, local universities, and other 
development organizations. 
v.  My Addition to the Critiques 
 As previously stated, TI updated the methodology in 2012 in part to address the 
aforementioned critiques.  These changes are meant to improve the reliability of the data 
in two principle ways: 1 – Improving the reliability of data from year to year on any 
                                                                                                                                            
Governance Indicators: Answering the Critics,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4149 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2007), Accessed May 12, 2014, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965077. 
 
157 Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law, 12. 
 
158 For example, Transparency International now issues the “Global Corruption Barometer” and 
“The Bribe Payers Index,” Transparency International, Accessed April 9, 2014, 
http://www.transparency.org/research. 
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specific country so that changes can be more easily tracked and managed, and; 2 – 
making the data more statistically sound for use in comparing across countries or regions.  
These changes, if effective, may combat the first two critiques above, but fail to address 
the third and fourth critique.  Furthermore, I argue that this list of critiques needs to be 
more nuanced so that it considers both the audience for the report and the policy 
implications that flow from country rankings.  Put simply, improving the quality and 
reliability of the aggregate measures does not change what is purportedly being 
measured, nor does it change who is being asked to measure it.  After the 2012 update the 
data may simply be a more accurate measurement of elite perspectives on business-
related public sector corruption. 
This is problematic not simply because a small number of voices are being heard 
but also because a narrow view of corrupt behavior is being emphasized.  The focus on 
certain types of corruption – namely bribes, kick-backs, and complicated, often illegal 
permitting schemes orchestrated by public officials – emphasizes the perceptions and 
actions of very specific individuals: those attempting to do business within the country, 
and those high-level state officials who have the power and authority to actually control 
or benefit from allowing business people to do their work.  Furthermore, even if the CPI 
was expanded to include perceptions of both public and private sector corruption it is still 
focusing on a narrowly defined set of actions that can be measured in monetary terms.  
This in turn leads to anti-corruption programs that stress asset recovery instead of 
institutional reform, which often have limited effects and are used as political weapons.159   
                                                
159 This is based on my independent research with 2 domestic anti-corruption agencies: the 
Tribunal de Ética Gubernamental (TEG) in San Salvador and the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) in 
Islamabad. 
 
  75 
Anti-corruption rhetoric is often justified by the argument that corruption impedes 
development and hurts the world’s poor.  Yet how can this be argument be served by 
measurements of elite perceptions of public sector corruption?  The CPI (and related 
indices) do not investigate perceptions of corruption among the poor, nor do these reports 
study the type of corruption and abuse of power that the poor experience on a daily basis.  
This is because most people in these “corrupt” countries will never experience first hand 
the embezzlement, kickbacks, illegal permitting schemes, or bribes from multinational 
companies that the CPI measures.  Granted, strong arguments have been made that this 
type of “mega-corruption” and high-level bribes directly relate to the levels of poverty 
and freedom within countries.  However, I argue that the average person’s concerns with 
corruption go far beyond how much money high-level government officials steal from 
multi-national corporations or foreign governments.160  People are generally concerned 
more about lower level corruption that is pervasive (also called “systemic corruption”161).  
Similarly, high levels of perceived corruption among the general public – regardless of 
where their country ranks on the corruption perceptions index – often leads to low levels 
of state legitimacy, violence, and impunity.  This creates a reinforcing cycle that Uslaner 
calls “the inequality trap.”162 
The simplicity of the CPI makes it a perfect tool for media campaigns and 
political stump speeches, and it also presents support to age-old ethnocentric and racist 
views about how some regions or peoples are simply more “corrupt” than others.  A 
                                                
160 This argument is based on my research in El Salvador and Pakistan, where many people took 
this type of “mega-corruption” for granted.   
 
161 Michael Johnston, “Fighting Systemic Corruption,” 89-90.  
 
162 Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law, 26-28. 
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country’s CPI ranking affects its ability to receive financing from international public and 
private banks, get support from bilateral aid agencies, receive foreign direct investment, 
and work directly with international NGOs on transparency and anti-corruption 
initiatives.163  These problems then cause countries with bad rankings on the CPI to 
respond by building domestic anti-corruption agencies that are either misguided or 
ineffective (or sometimes both).  These agencies, not surprisingly, focus specifically on 
doing what they can to shore up their books and make high-level corruption less 
noticeable.  To do this they emphasize combating specific types of corruption – those 
experienced by the elites whose perceptions matter for the CPI.  This emphasis can 
manifest in different ways depending on the strength of domestic legal institutions and 
the perceived relationship between corruption and other development, security, or 
geopolitical goals.  If corruption is perceived as bad but not a significant barrier to 
growth, as is the case in El Salvador, the creation of an anti-corruption agency (the 
Tribunal de Ética Gubernamental) is simply a political move that has no teeth and 
ultimately produces few results.  In these situations fighting corruption is perceived as 
one among many concerns, too politically sensitive, and thus a poor ranking on the CPI 
does little more than influence public opinion and reduce state legitimacy.   
In other cases, where corruption is seen as one of or perhaps the most important 
barrier to development and economic growth, a bad score on the CPI may lead to robust 
anti-corruption agencies that unfortunately only focus on asset recovery and financial 
                                                
163 See, generally Picard & Buss, A Fragile Balance, 126 (explaining the relationships between 
World Bank and IMF conditionality with CPI rankings); In my research in El Salvador and Pakistan I have 
also personally been told by officials at USAID and various NGOs that a country’s CPI score is taken into 
consideration by their organization when determining aid allocations, disbursement schedules, and 
monitoring and evaluation procedures. 
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transparency instead of prosecution, punishment, and institutional reforms.  Pakistan 
presents a classic example of this situation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH IN SUPPORT OF ARGUMENT: EL SALVADOR 
A.  RELEVANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
El Salvador is confronting systemic corruption, yet those who study corruption or 
governance in Latin America often focus their research elsewhere.  Part of this is due to the 
country’s post-colonial history, and part of it is due to simple geopolitical truths: El Salvador is 
the smallest (but most densely populated) country in Central America and, for better or worse, it 
does not receive the attention that larger, more politically and economically powerful states such 
as Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina or Brazil regularly do.  Furthermore, because “corruption has 
deep and firm roots within” the entire Latin American region, there has been a tendency to treat 
corruption in Latin America as not a new development but one built upon hundreds of years of 
populist politics and clientelism.164  Similarly, Western scholars have traditionally viewed Latin 
American culture as one that emphasizes personal relationships and weak institutions, a lack of 
respect for the rule of law yet a strong adherence to hierarchy and social customs.165  The belief 
is that strong ties to family and inner-circle groups, respect for formalism, and a history of 
corporatism throughout Latin America have created a citizen-state relationship that looks to 
outsiders like social tolerance and acceptance of otherwise corrupt behavior.166  However 
problematic these beliefs may be, the perspective that Latin Americans trust their caudillo 
                                                
164 Charles M. Blake and Stephen D. Morris, “Corruption and Politics in Latin America,” in eds. 
Charles M. Blake and Stephen D. Morris, Corruption and Politics in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2010), 13-17.   
 
165 Blake and Morris, “Corruption and Politics in Latin America,” 13-15; see also Jorge Nef, 
“Government Corruption in Latin America,” in Where Corruption Lives, eds. Caiden et. al. (West Hartford, 
CT: Kumarian Press, 2001). 
 
166 Howard Wiarda, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, Revisited, (Gainesville, 
FL: University Press of Florida Press, 2004). 
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leaders more than any formal government institution has, until recently, been at the forefront of 
the relevant literature.  Yet in recent years this perspective has received considerable critique 
alongside a demand for a more nuanced understanding of the corruption problems throughout the 
region.167 
Although historical and cultural explanations for corruption come with their own 
problems (see section II.b., supra), a brief overview of El Salvador’s history can provide the 
backdrop for some of the country’s current corruption problems.  El Salvador gained 
independence from Spain in 1832 and became an independent republic in 1839.  In the early 
years El Salvador relied primarily on profits from the international indigo and later coffee trade 
to support itself, yet it was marked by frequent and bloody revolutions.  Like much of Latin 
America, its economy and politics were ruled by a small group of powerful families and the 
forces they controlled.  In 1931 General Maximillian Hernández Martínez became President after 
a military coup, a moment that began roughly sixty years of military dictatorship.  In the 
following year a peasant uprising erupted in the Western part of the country, led by local activist 
Farabundo Martí.  Martí and his followers demanded, among other things, redistribution of land 
and better working conditions for the majority of the country’s poor farmers.  They also called 
for an end to corrupt and heavy-handed politics throughout the country, demands that were at the 
heart of the civil war more than 50 years later.  This 1932 uprising was quickly crushed by the 
Salvadoran military in a massacre that killed over 30,000 mostly indigenous peasant farmers.168  
For most of the 20th century there were many attempts at elections that were neither free nor fair.  
                                                
167 See, e.g. Corruption and Politics in Latin America, eds. Stephen D. Morris and Charles Blake. 
 
168 Estimates vary from 10,000 to 40,000, but the generally accepted number number is roughly 
30,000 killed.  
  80 
The Salvadoran military – and its corporate and international supporters – did not truly lose 
power until the war ended in 1992.   
After decades of poverty and injustice the Salvadoran public began demanding 
changes from in the 1970s.  Up until this time there had been an “alliance between the military 
and the agro-export elite” that controlled all aspects of government and the economy,169 and this 
group regularly used violence and intimidation to suppress opposition.  In 1979 there was an 
internal coup that led to the establishment of a Revolutionary Government Junta of El Salvador, 
an event that coincided with the beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War.  The underlying causes 
of the war included a mix of political, social, and economic inequalities and concerns about poor 
governance and corruption.170  The war lasted from 1979 until Peace Accords were signed more 
than twelve years later; during this time approximately 75,000 people died and much of the state 
was destroyed.  A peace agreement between the government of El Salvador and the Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was signed in January of 1992 at Chapultepec Palace, 
Mexico City.  Since 1992 El Salvador has seen some levels of impressive economic growth, 
relatively free elections, and peaceful transitions of power.  Yet the legacies of these conflicts 
remain strong, and distrust of the state or anyone in uniform continues to inhibit public efforts 
towards peace, reconciliation, and increased civic engagement.  Furthermore, political conflict 
has been recently overshadowed by gang warfare and the introduction of international narco-
trafficking organizations throughout the country.   
The history of governance in El Salvador and Latin America in general created a 
situation ripe for corruption, inequality, and disrespect for the rule of law.  Despite hundreds of 
                                                
169 Bertram Spector, Negotiating Peace and Confronting Corruption: Lessons for Postconflict 
Societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 25. 
 
170 Spector, Negotiation Peace and Confronting Corruption, 26-27. 
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millions of dollars spent on post-conflict peace building, economic development, and 
institutional reform, the Salvadoran state still lacks what Guillermo O’Donnell termed 
“horizontal accountability.”  O’Donnell defines horizontal accountability (HA) as 
“the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, 
and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine 
oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or 
omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as 
unlawful.”171 
 
Specifically, O’Donnell explains that horizontal accountability refers to a subset of 
interactions between state actors that are taken with the “explicit purpose of preventing, 
cancelling, redressing and/or punishing actions by another state agency that are deemed 
unlawful, whether on grounds of encroachment or corruption.”172  When states lack this type of 
accountability it often leads to the “legal institutionalization of mistrust.”173  Due to its history of 
militarism and corporatism,174 El Salvador is especially prone to this lack of institutional 
accountability.  Despite the Peace Accords in 1992, which required dissolution of certain 
factions of the military and police yet also allowed for the FMLN to enter the mainstream as 
legal political party, power and control has until very recently remained in the hands of those 
military and business leaders who led before and during the war.  The first seventeen years of 
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Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, 
and Marc. F. Plattner, 29-52 (Boulder, CO; Lynne Reinier Publishing, 1999). 
 
172 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability: The Legal Institutionalization of Mistrust” 
in Democratic Accountability in Latin America, eds. Mainwaring & Welna (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
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174 I use Wiarada’s definition of corporatism: a state the relies on “the organization of society by 
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control of these groups [is] under state authority.”  See Howard J. Wiarada, “Whatever Happened to 
Corporatism and Authoritarianism in Latin America?” in ed. Wiarada , Authoritarianism and Corporatism 
in Latin America, Revisited (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2004), 3. 
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“free and fair” democratic elections in El Salvador resulted in the same party winning each time 
(the Nationalist Republican Alliance or ARENA party).  During this period the economic and 
political power in the country remained in the hands of those who have traditionally held power.  
That being said, El Salvador has seen some political and economic improvements since the war: 
transitions of power remained peaceful (even when the FMLN won the presidency in 2009), per 
capita GDP and human development indicators have improved steadily,175 and the government 
of El Salvador retained positive relations with most of its neighbors and powerful Western 
allies.176   
Despite the aforementioned improvements, ten years after the end of the war El 
Salvador continued to suffer from widespread corruption, a dysfunctional legal system, high 
levels of impunity, and a deep seated but generalized cynicism about the efficacy of institutional 
reforms;177 unfortunately, my research shows that many of these problems have not improved in 
the second decade of El Salvador’s “third wave of democracy”.  According to recent reports 
from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index and the World Bank 
Governance Indicators, it continues to receive poor scores with respect to judicial 
independence178 and the level to which the public can freely voice their expressions and hold 
                                                
175 “El Salvador Country Profile,” UNDP Human Development Report, Accessed July 9, 2014, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SLV. 
 
176 “El Salvador,” United States Agency for International Development, Accessed July 8, 2014, 
http://www.usaid.gov/el-salvador. 
 
177 Michael Dodson and Donald W. Jackson, “Horizontal Accountability and the Rule of Law in 
Central America,” in , Democratic Accountability in Latin America, eds. Scott Mainwaring and Christopher 
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178 “Global Competitiveness Index,” World Economic Forum, Accessed July 9, 2014, 
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their government officials accountable.179  Similarly, its human rights ombudsman’s office and 
fledgling anti-corruption agency remain ineffective at best (see research findings, below). 
Despite public distrust of government or cynicism about institutional reforms, the 
Salvadoran government has made several (at least symbolic) efforts to combat corruption at the 
national level.  El Salvador created a Human Rights Ombudsman’s office shortly after the Peace 
Accords and later signed both the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (ratified in 
1998) and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (ratified 2004).  In the meantime, 
however, neoliberal economic policies have continued to be implemented despite public 
resistance.  This created situations where privatization and the mass accumulation of wealth by 
small segments of the population continued alongside widespread and at times systematic human 
rights abuses.180  This is unsurprising.  Like elsewhere in Latin America and the developing 
world, the combination of democratic transitions, economic crises, and the implementation of 
neoliberal economic reforms created an environment where “old forms of graft not only 
continue, but . . . new corrupt practices” take hold.181  Put simply, “the heralded policies of 
economic deregulation and privatization, instead of promoting less government intervention and 
greater transparency in business activities, can turn into new means to pursue old [corrupt] 
ends.”182  This is all quite evident to the Salvadoran public and especially the professional class, 
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which explain why my research and that of others continues to show that the Salvadorans hold “a 
deep alienation with respect to both the political and legal systems” in their country.183  
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
i. Local Perceptions: Corruption Runs Rampant 
Corruption and impunity remain significant problems for El Salvador.  In the 2013 
Corruption Perceptions Index El Salvador received a score of 38 / 100, and was ranked 83rd out 
of 177 countries.184  Though not nearly as poorly ranked as Pakistan, El Salvador’s CPI score 
tied it with other historically corrupt countries such as Jamaica, Liberia and Peru.  Perhaps more 
troubling is that after more than twenty years of institutional reform efforts El Salvador’s 
conviction rate remains an incredibly low 5%.185  As stated above, corruption and impunity are 
often mutually reinforcing problems.  While gang-related violence has been a significant 
problem for El Salvador since at least the turn of the century, corruption-related violence is 
increasing; threats of violence against police and prosecutors, politically motivated murders, 
extortion, and kidnappings for ransom are all common in El Salvador.  Some of this is a legacy 
of the post-civil war amnesty law and ongoing debates about the extent to which past 
perpetrators should be held accountable.  However, much of the current concerns about 
corruption and impunity stem from gang violence and the ability of domestic and international 
narcotics gangs to wield influence over the police, the (historically weak) Attorney General’s 
office, and the courts.  This in turn leads to high perceptions of corruption among the public, 
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which further reinforces corrupt and violent behavior at all levels.186  Thus, it is unsurprising that 
nearly all of my research subjects – even those who worked for the Salvadoran government – 
feared that gang violence and gang-related corruption had infiltrated the judicial system and 
other parts of the state far more than was understood by the international community. 
My research uncovered two broad corruption-related problems that highlight how the 
dominant perspective, and the survey methods, policies, and institutional reforms that flow from 
it, are misguided.  The first theme I uncovered in El Salvador was that the public perception of 
corruption was much worse than what international indices like the CPI reported.  I believe this 
is because in many ways there are two El Salvadors – one represented by the 2% of the country 
that regularly uses glitzy shopping malls, international business centers, and expensive 
restaurants and resorts; these are the parts of El Salvador that international experts, 
businessmen/women, and foreign government employees regularly experience alongside current 
Salvadoran government and business elites.187  The other El Salvador represents the daily life of 
the vast majority of the Salvadoran public, rich and poor, educated and uneducated alike.  This 
El Salvador is a lesson in contrast: moderate levels of economic growth, new housing, and 
increased educational opportunities sit alongside entrenched rural poverty, gang warfare, and 
incredibly high levels of violence against women.188  For the majority of Salvadorans that live in 
this El Salvador, economic realities may be improving but that is often in spite of the fact that the 
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government, and everyone who works for it, is perceived as corrupt or, at best, simply unable or 
unwilling to provide basic services in an equal and impartial manner.  Nonetheless, many who 
visit or work in El Salvador never experience this.  Especially since El Salvador was chosen as 
one of President Obama’s 4 “Partnership for Growth” countries the Salvadoran government and 
business community has bent over backwards to cater to international aid workers, businessmen, 
and members of international institutions.  Perhaps not surprisingly, most Salvadorans never 
interact with these individuals and thus their own perspective on issues such as corruption differ 
drastically from the internationally reported perceptions contained in the CPI.  
All but one of the people I interviewed spoke at length about the damage that 
corruption and impunity inflicted on Salvadoran society.  Different people described the causes 
of corruption differently, but everyone spoke of similar consequences: increased violence, 
limited economic growth, a general lack of trust and support for government institutions.  They 
also repeatedly referenced fear of people in uniform, especially the police and the military.  
Some of this fear no doubt stems from the civil war, but even the young, relatively well-off 
students I regularly met with were openly afraid of the police.  Why?  The short answer was 
always related to corruption and the abuse of power; these students were confident that, even in 
the event of an emergency, introducing the Salvadoran police into any situation would only made 
things worse.  Uncertainty and inconsistency in police reporting, fears of extortion and threats, 
and simple incompetency were common complaints.  Put simply, my subjects knew that unless 
they had powerful and wealthy parents willing to step in the police might make their life worse.   
Yet these fears went beyond the armed men and women in uniform.  Many of my 
interview subjects considered corruption the backbone of the Salvadoran judicial system, noting 
that any attempt to bring a case in the local courts was useless unless you had more money, 
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connections, or both than the accused.  Even those interview subjects who were members of 
wealthy and powerful families hesitated to bring cases against known or suspected criminals, 
especially gang members.  The overwhelming belief was that the traditional Salvadoran gangs 
had now joined forces with groups exercising even more power: ex-military and police officials, 
often those who had been “purged” from service after the Peace Accords; international narco-
trafficking gangs, especially Mexican cartels; and unscrupulous businessmen or political middle-
men who might use gangs as mercenaries for hire.  This fear was particularly problematic for 
human rights activists and members of the NGO community, as seeking justice and reparations 
for past abuses put them in danger of becoming victims to corruption and corruption-related 
violence on a near daily basis.189 
With respect to general questions about corruption, all but one of my subjects 
described despair and disbelief at any hope of limiting corruption in the future.  Many believed 
that the entire judicial system would need to be gutted and reorganized with new lawyers, new 
judges, and new institutional protections to keep those lawyers and judges safe from the 
criminals that tend to threaten and extort them.  Most members of the human rights community 
felt strongly that the current problems with corruption and impunity would never be addressed 
until the 1993 Amnesty law was repealed; to them, the fact that war criminals and political 
assassins were walking the streets openly - some as successful businessmen and others in 
political office – represented the underlying problem.  They believe that until past abuses were 
rectified there would be no justice or true institutional reform.   
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One high-ranking government official with whom I spent a considerable amount of 
time went further and took a more nuanced approach in placing blame for corruption.  To him, 
corruption represented a “crisis of values” that permeated all aspects of Salvadoran society, 
including the government, the church, and individual families; to solve it would take generations 
and would require new efforts at education, peace building, and civic engagement.  Members of 
the human rights community and several of the private attorneys I spoke with agreed with this 
assessment yet were hesitant to assume that the future reform could survive without seeking 
justice for past abuses.  To them, corruption was a societal problem that ran deep throughout all 
the official and unofficial Salvadoran institutions, but it was one that could only be rectified 
through continued demands for peace, justice, and respect for the rule of law.  Granted, none of 
these subjects could point to specific cases of proven corruption, a problem that other researchers 
have encountered while studying this problem in Central America.190  Nonetheless, for reasons 
argued in this thesis and elsewhere, the lack of “proven” corruption cases should not be seen as 
proof that corruption is not a problem.  In some situations the lack of corruption convictions is 
actually evidence of wider problems, and in other cases it is clear that the perception of 
widespread corruption can create negative effects even if there is not proof of specific corrupt 
acts. 
The businessmen and foreigners I spoke with provided an alternate perspective.  First 
they smiled and politely told me that yes, corruption was endemic, but no, they did not speak 
openly about it or hope to change it because if they did they would not be able to continue their 
                                                
190 See, e.g., Dodson and Jackson, “Horrizontal Accountability and the Rule of Law,” in eds. 
Mainwairing and Welna, Democratic Accountability in Latin America, 237. (“In an October 1994 report 
ONUSAL presented a list of 52 judges against whom serious complaints of incompetence or corruption had 
been made.  According to a January 1997 account, in the three years that followed . . . the Salvadoran 
Supreme Court had sanctioned 57 judges. . . . However, our subsequent interviews revealed that none of the 
57 cases involved proven corruption.”) 
  89 
work in the country.  Several US government officials told me - off the record - that despite 
whatever mandate their department had they could not openly discuss corruption problems with 
members of the Salvadoran government because doing so would “end the conversation 
immediately.”  This is in and of itself not surprising, but it does raise significant concerns for 
standard corruption measurements; the people that openly admit to not being able to talk about or 
combat corruption are the same individuals whose perceptions are measured in international 
indices like the CPI.  At the very least, this begs the question: on what are these people basing 
their perceptions?   
Throughout my interviews only one subject downplayed the corruption problems 
facing El Salvador.  He was a mid-level administrative judge in charge of handling inter-agency 
litigation about misuse of government funds, among other types of cases.  In addition, his office 
was responsible for receiving complaints about corrupt local officials from each of El Salvador’s 
fourteen departments.  He said corruption was not a problem, and that in his twenty plus years of 
experience on the bench he had only witnessed one “true” corruption case.  After asking follow-
up questions it became quite clear that what he meant by “true”.  According to him the vast 
majority of corruption claims brought by individual citizens were invalid and based on silly 
personal disputes.  He clearly stated that his office did not even investigate 95% of the 
complaints because they were brought without evidence by uneducated citizens who did not – 
and in many cases could not – understand the complexities of what they were talking about.  In 
his opinion, most people who brought claims against their mayor or a local municipal police 
officer for extortion, misuse of public funds, or even violent crimes such as rape and assault were 
like children trying to tell on their brother or sister for acts that were not actually committed.  If, 
on the other hand, an educated individual such as myself brought a complaint that included 
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written accounts of corrupt behavior or additional proof, they would spare no expense to 
investigate.  But that never happened, as most of the Salvadoran citizens who brought complaints 
to his department “cannot even read and write, so how can we trust them?”  This certainly felt 
like the internalization of the global development discourse.  Sure, he said, corruption exists in El 
Salvador, it exists everywhere, but it is not a major problem.  I can understand why he feels that 
way, especially if other judges and attorneys share his pejorative opinions of the Salvadoran 
public.   
ii. Corruption and Violence in El Salvador 
The second general theme I uncovered in El Salvador, which was different than 
Pakistan (see chapter V, below), was that Salvadorans had no problem drawing a direct link 
between corruption (and impunity) and violence.  To most of my interview subjects the 
longstanding belief that the government and its employees were “up for sale” to the highest 
bidder created fear, mistrust, and disrespect for the rule of law throughout Salvadoran society.  
These individuals recounted stories of friends or family members who had been violently abused, 
only to have their abuser pay off the police.  Others recounted reading the daily accounts of 
violence in the newspaper yet never hearing about convictions, which instilled in them (and their 
families) a deep-seated belief that the justice system was either rigged or completely incompetent 
(or in some cases both).  This was particularly problematic for human rights activists and their 
attorneys, as they strongly believed that corruption and violence were teaching the children well 
defined but illegitimate perspectives on the relationship between an individual citizen and the 
state.  Furthermore, fear of the police and distrust of the law caused individual citizens to settle 
disputes themselves.  Children were growing up disrespecting or fearing government officials 
which, in conjunction with limited economic opportunities, too often led to gang involvement 
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once these children reached adolescence.  Otherwise law abiding families and neighborhood 
groups joined together to protect themselves against gangs and the police alike, which often 
resulted in more reckless illegal behavior and violence.   
iii. El Tribunal de Ética Gubernamental 
Amid long-standing complaints of corruption and incompetence, the Salvadoran 
legislature passed the Governmental Ethics law in 2006.  Among other things, this law 
established El Salvador’s first independent anti-corruption agency, the Tribunal de Ética 
Gubernamental (TEG), the following year.  TEG’s mandate was large and included ethical 
guidelines for various government departments, along with increasing transparency mechanisms 
so that the public would have more information about the government actions and initiatives at 
all levels.  Directors were appointed, staff was hired, and public anti-corruption pronouncements 
began.  Yet despite what was made publically available on the website TEG’s functions were 
literally and figuratively limited from the outset, as often happens with domestic anti-corruption 
agencies.  When I arrived to speak with one of the directors in 2011 TEG still did not have an 
official office, its agents had been appointed but were not being paid, and its public face – the 
website – had been temporarily shut down due to lack of funds.  Not surprisingly, it seems that 
many of the legislators who originally voted (to much public fanfare) to pass the law of 
governmental ethics were hesitant to grant it more powers or even renew its budget.   
When I returned in 2012 the situation at TEG was improving, albeit slowly.  The 
organization had finally been set up in an office with desks, a few computers, and (perhaps most 
importantly) some security.  The website was reopened, and they had begun educational 
campaigns on billboards and in schools.  These campaigns were preventative in nature, meant to 
educate the public and especially children about what constituted “corrupt” behavior, what 
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should be done about it, and what its consequences were for society.  According to TEG’s sub-
director this seemingly small yet creative effort was the best they could do with the limitations 
they had.  TEG’s budget had been renewed but remained limited: most of it was spent renting the 
office and purchasing the few pieces of equipment, so there was almost nothing left for 
administrative staff or corruption-related investigations.  Nonetheless, TEG officials and their 
supporters saw this as a promising step forward because even publicizing the nature and (at this 
point still hypothetical) responsibilities of El Salvador’s first permanent anti-corruption agency 
could have ripple effects throughout society.   
That being said, everyone I spoke with seemed at once both proud of TEG’s work and 
disillusioned by it.  Most had other careers and thus could not afford to continue working without 
pay, and some openly suspected that the organization would forever be limited by politics and an 
unrealistic budget.  Some expressed hope that external support could or even would arrive, 
perhaps from the U.S. government or other international development agencies.  Others were 
skeptical, often for good reason.  Considering that US government officials had openly told me 
that fighting corruption was counterproductive to their other economic and strategic concerns, I 
remain hesitant to believe that any influx of U.S. development aid into TEG will happen in the 
near future. 
 Despite these limitations, TEG and its employees continue to make the best of the 
resources they have.  In the eighteen months since I conducted my research this anti-corruption 
agency continues to collect data, receive complaints, and regularly publicize their efforts.  TEG 
has established municipal councils throughout the country and continues to define and promote 
ethical practices to government institutions at all levels.  The education campaign has continued, 
and it has been expanded to include student government groups, essay contests, and other related 
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activities.  Although TEG still does not have a clear mandate (or the resources required) to 
investigate and prosecute individuals for corrupt behavior, it is part of an effort to change 
society’s deeply entrenched belief that corruption is and will remain an everyday aspect of 
Salvadoran culture.  Some of this emphasis is related to a realistic appropriation of how to use 
limited funds, yet some of it is ideological; the same government official who lamented 
corruption as a “crisis of values” is now a key member of the TEGs leadership. 
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CHAPTER V  
RESEARCH IN SUPPORT OF ARGUMENT: PAKISTAN 
A.  RELEVANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
For Pakistan, corruption has always been a fact of life, much as rain 
during the monsoon season.191 
 
i.  Corruption in Pakistan: The Early Years 
Almost immediately after partition Pakistan became embroiled in corruption 
allegations that affected senior politicians,192 and unfortunately the situation seems to 
have changed little since.  To many, however, the current corruption problem tends to 
look much, much worse than the early days.  Despite inheriting what many considered a 
competent albeit abusive civil service apparatus from the British, Pakistani politicians 
quickly became known for corruption and incompetence.  Regional and ethnic factions 
led to increased patronage and a culture of building political support through the milking 
of state funds for one’s own family, ethnic group, or business associates.  Additionally, 
despite the initial fanfare involved in statehood, the new Pakistani citizens spent the 
better part of the 1940s and 1950s “still coming to terms with the impact on their identity 
that independence combined with partition had produced.”193  It seemed that with 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s death in 1948 the time of optimism and hope passed.  Jinnah’s 
repeated emphasis on equality, justice, and sovereignty for all Pakistanis in some ways 
died with him, and soon after it became clear how little Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan 
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actually trusted other Pakistani politicians.194  The passage of the Public and 
Representatives Office (Disqualification) Act (PRODA) in 1949 made bribery, nepotism, 
and corruption criminal offenses,195 and some historians even blame the failure of the 
first attempt at democracy on political corruption and ineptitude.196  Put simply, those not 
involved in the entrenched corruption left over from the British colonial structure were 
too unqualified or inept to fundamentally change the system.  In the first decade of the 
Pakistani state political infighting caused a “rotating door” of Prime Ministers, delayed 
the passage of a constitution until 1956, and arguably instigated the first military coup in 
1958.197   
An early example of judicial corruption occurred during this first decade and 
helped set the stage for future relations between the branches of government.  In 1955 the 
Pakistan Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly (the 
legislature) by the executive, and Chief Justice Munir included in the ruling a peculiar yet 
admittedly honest reason: there was no use in issuing writs against people it cannot force 
to comply.198  Three years later the same Chief Justice ruled against a petition 
challenging the first military coup, and thus the precedent was set: the judiciary, being 
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“neither independent nor honest,” would defer to the executive and legislative branches 
when pushed.199  Because there is no true system of checks and balances, and because 
any attempts on behalf of the Supreme Court to assert its constitutional powers were 
quickly checked, corruption in the broad sense permeated even the highest courts in the 
country.  Interestingly enough, only recently (since the mid-2000s) had the Supreme 
Court, under the ever-assertive Chief Justice Chaudhry, been able to appropriately assert 
its independence and force powerful members of the executive and legislative branches to 
submit to their authority. 
 A survey of “Letters to the Editor” of the English-language newspaper Dawn in 
the early years of the state show many connections to the complaints still being heard 
today: bureaucratic incompetency; inability to provide basic goods and especially 
services to the people, such as employment, food, electricity and sanitary living 
conditions; and, of course, the looting of public coffers for private enrichment.200  By the 
early 1950s press reports about corrupt officials being arrested became common, and 
soon “ordinary Pakistanis found themselves coming face to face on a daily basis with 
what they frequently termed ‘graft’.”201  This no doubt affected how ordinary Pakistanis 
interacted with all levels of their government, how they trusted the judicial system, and 
how they interpreted their ability to flex the democratic muscles they believed came with 
the creation of the nation.  To many citizens there was an obvious disconnect between 
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what had been promised by the creation of the state and what was being delivered, and in 
some ways this disconnect has plagued Pakistan ever since.  Using patronage to secure 
support for the regime had been a key asset for the British during colonial times, but 
surprisingly enough the “massive expansion” of this system soon “made it appear as if 
the power to dispense, with no accountability whatsoever, ever-increasing official 
patronage was almost the sole reason for governing” in Pakistan.202 
 Another argument for how corruption became systemic in Pakistan relates to the 
competition for resources in the post-partition period and how evacuees’ property was 
redistributed as a way of securing political and other power.  Ilyas Chattha argues that it 
was the appropriation – or rather misappropriation – of property abandoned by migrating 
Sikhs and Hindus that helped institutionalize corruption in Pakistan.203  Simply stated, 
Chattha argues that “the legacy of Partition forms a common backdrop” to a wide variety 
of corrupt activities, from individual acts of misappropriation of funds and nepotism to 
more systemic or “gross administrative corruption.”204  Partition and the flood of refugees 
(in both directions) created a situation ripe for corruption in South Asia, in which civil 
servants, politicians, local elites and, of course, the military sought to enrich themselves 
at the expense of those who left or had just arrived.  Even counting the amount of 
property left behind – which included land (arable and otherwise), urban and rural 
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dwellings, shops, factories and raw materials – proved to be a contentious issue between 
India and Pakistan and helped fawn the flames of a conflict that to this day continues.205    
From a legal standpoint, the official transfer of any amount of evacuee property 
could not be finalized until India and Pakistan resolved the myriad issues surrounding it.  
Considering the tense relationship between the two young nations (which continues 
today), this process could not function as smoothly as hoped or planned.  Although both 
states created agencies to deal with evacuee property, and both claimed to spend years 
making sure the property was permanently allotted to its rightful owners, “it is clear from 
both documentary and oral sources that local residents, as well as officials and politicians 
[for years] attempted to enrich themselves or their relatives by occupying evacuee 
territory.”206  Thus the struggle played out between all the various peoples occupying the 
land that was now Pakistan, and helped foment divisions between otherwise likeminded 
groups.  In turn this helped establish a situation where corruption cannot be viewed in the 
simple, Western sense of simple greed for money or political power.  As Anatol Lieven 
makes clear, corruption took on kinship dimensions of “collective solidarity and defence 
[sic]”; to this day: 
“Defence of honour and the interests of the kinship group usually 
outweighs loyalty to a party, to the state, or to any code of professional 
ethics, not only for ordinary Pakistanis but for most politicians and 
officials.  It is important to understand therefore that much Pakistani 
corruption is the result not of a lack of values (as it is seen usually in the 
West) but of the positive and ancient value of loyalty to family and 
clan.”207 
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 This notion of a corrupt bureaucracy, led by politicians who dole out favors for 
their kinship group or an alliance of those who support them, became the common theme 
for decades of elections and multiple military coups.  As mentioned earlier, the first coup 
in 1958 was justified as a response to corrupt and inept public officials.  The 
Proclamation of a State of Emergency stated that the Constituent Assembly had “lost the 
confidence of the people and can no longer function,” but some Pakistani scholars argue 
that regardless of whether this was justifiable the dissolution of the legislative body 
“threw the country into chaos and confusion by reviving old rivalries and reopening old 
controversies.”208  Not surprisingly, the coup did not fix the problems of the previous 
government, and left the population under a state of Martial Law with no political parties.  
The next wave of democratic activism (the anti-Ayub campaign of November 1968) was 
led by two slogans: “Death to the Servant King” and “End Corruption.”209  The rise of the 
Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) and its leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the late 1960s and the 
PPP in the early 1970s enlivened the Pakistani populace and re-opened floodgates of 
civic engagement, yet like the politics of the past the PPP built itself not on democratic 
principles but on the utilization of patronage.210  Despite promises to reform the 
bureaucracy and revive Pakistan’s place on the international state, foreign and domestic 
concerns211 created further violence within Pakistan and ultimately led to another 
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bloodless coup on July 5, 1977.  The Army Commander-in-Chief General Zia-ul-Haq, 
despite promises of elections in 90 days, tried and executed the once-popular Bhutto on 
trumped up murder charges and presided over the longest period of military rule in 
Pakistan’s history, 11 years.212  Judicial corruption became apparent once again when 
Bhutto’s wife, Nusrat, challenged the validity of the military detention of the governing 
PPP members before the Supreme Court and lost; just as two decades earlier with Ayub 
Khan, Zia’s extra-constitutional assumption of power was ruled legitimate on the doctrine 
of state necessity by the one body that had the duty and legitimate authority to overrule 
it.213   
Military rule suited the country economically and provided a stable base for the 
United States to work in the tail end of the Cold War, but it in no way changed the level 
or nature of corruption.  In fact, as has been shown in countries such as China, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, high levels of corruption and close connections between state entities 
and private corporations are counter-intuitively compatible with significant economic 
growth.214  In certain cases, especially societies in transition that lack stable democratic 
institutions and have low levels of civic engagement, some corrupt acts can even lead to a 
net social benefit; unfortunately the line is quite thin and even in these cases corruption 
generally leads to “inefficiency, injustice, and inequity.”215  Thus despite the Pakistani 
military’s ability to distance itself somewhat from kinship interests and the corruption 
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that come with them, in many ways it has only been able to do this by “turning itself into 
a sort of giant kinship group, extracting patronage from the state and distributing it to its 
members” in the same way that powerful clan leaders turned politicians do.216  This was 
seen in many other parts of the world where authoritarian regimes that rely on financial 
and military support offered by wealthier states have a long track record of milking the 
system for the benefit of a few while violently repressing the masses (e.g. El Salvador, 
Argentina, the Philippines, etc.).   
Despite lagging in many economic and development indicators Pakistan increased 
privatization under Zia, a process that led to the influx of foreign capital and technology.  
This far outpaced the building and strengthening of civic institutions needed to monitor, 
track, and distribute the new technology and the wealth associated with it, which no 
doubt increased the temptations and payouts available to those in a position to abuse the 
system for personal enrichment.  By the time democracy was restored in 1988, with the 
return of the PPP and the election of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister, high hopes of a 
new era did not diminish the fact notion that “the wielding of political power and 
corruption [were by this time] synonymous in Pakistan’s public mind.”217  Unfortunately, 
the return to democracy did not change this whatsoever. 
ii. Corruption in the Contemporary Context: Benazir Bhutto to the Present 
As first female head of state of a Muslim nation, Benazir Bhutto came to power 
with immense international and domestic expectations.  Some argue that the failures of 
her government must be analyzed alongside the impossible expectations placed upon her 
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and the incredible political problems she inherited.218  Regardless, Bhutto’s presidency 
and her dismissal for corruption by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1990 quickly 
returned the Pakistani public to a state of disillusionment.  Not only did she fail to 
achieve many of the successes that were expected of her, such as improving bilateral 
relations with Rajiv Gandhi’s India, but she was also constantly assailed with 
increasingly damaging charges of corruption, incompetence, and intimidation.219  Of 
course, these kinds of accusations are common in Pakistani politics, and even by this time 
false corruption claims used against political rivals made the term corruption and its use 
as an accusatory weapon almost a cliché.  Yet in Bhutto’s case there seems to be 
significant evidence to support at least some of the accusations against her and her 
husband, and a brief review of key events shows how these old corruption charges 
continue to cloud over Pakistan’s government and citizenry today. 
Throughout the 1990s the political pattern remained largely the same with respect 
to corruption, at least until the end of the decade.  Adding fuel to the fire set by her 
enemies, Bhutto’s husband Asif Ali Zardari attracted increasing amounts of negative 
attention at home and abroad and was rumored to have built a net worth of tens if not 
hundreds of millions of dollars; he was jailed on corruption charges by his wife’s 
successor, Nawaz Sharif, and Swiss Authorities opened a corruption investigation against 
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him in early 1995 at the request of Nawaz’s government.220  Many Pakistanis were fed up 
by this point with the Bhuttos and hoping for reform, but unfortunately “Nawaz Sharif’s 
[first] tenure (1990-1993) saw a continuation of confrontational politics . . . and claims of 
corruption” similar to those of his predecessor(s).221  He further liberalized the country’s 
economic system and pushed several populist programs intended to improve the lives of 
the poor, but his administration was increasingly under attack for financial 
mismanagement and he was eventually dismissed in 1993 by the same President – and 
under the same charges - that dismissed Benazir Bhutto three years earlier.222   
The period 1993-1997 saw increased economic despair, continued political 
infighting, and a lack of checks and balances between the branches of government.  Many 
prominent experts in international affairs – including U.S. foreign policy staff – began to 
wonder out loud whether Pakistan was already or soon to be a failed state.223  Between 
1988 and 1999 Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif each served two nonconsecutive terms 
as Prime Minister, making up what one scholar argues are the four most corrupt 
administrations in Pakistan’s history.224  For example, constant public outcry225 against 
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the corrupt practices of Benazir’s government led to her second administration being 
dismissed in 1996 in a similar fashion as the first, and the Ehtesab Ordinance (aka the 
“Law of Accountability”) passed in less than two weeks after her government 
dissolved.226  Unfortunately for Pakistan this attempt at reform, like so many others that 
came before it, failed to curb the levels or extent of corruption in the country.  This is at 
least partly because it would have required the elites – precisely those individuals that 
benefited from corruption – to enforce such laws.  At the same time the Pakistani 
government became increasingly isolated from international support as it suffered from 
terrorist attacks and what many still argue is an internal alliance between terrorist 
organizations and the powerful Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter-Services 
Intelligence Agency (ISI).  This was the backdrop for the Kargil War in Kashmir during 
the summer of 1999. 
Amid this backdrop of economic and security-related chaos General Pervez 
Musharraf ousted Nawaz Sharif and took power in a coup in October, 1999.  Musharraf, 
like all other coup leaders before, cited corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude as 
justification for the coup, but he also made key promises (at home and abroad) to finally 
go after those responsible for violence in the region and corruption at home.  In the 
beginning things actually seemed different with Musharraf at least with respect to 
pursuing the promises he made.  For example, he appointed popular public activists to his 
cabinet, began some aggressive moves against terrorist organizations operating within 
Pakistan and created the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to once and for all bring 
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those charged with corruption to answer for their crimes.227  Despite initial efforts by 
NAB to pursue or at least publicize accounts of Pakistanis who became rich milking the 
state, its enforcement mechanisms were never as strong as they needed to be.  Creating 
the anti-corruption agency was a step in the right direction but unfortunately had little 
effect in the short-term.  Allegations of corruption against politicians remained 
commonplace and other sectors of the government, including but not limited to the 
National Institute of Health,228 the military, and the Islamabad police229 also received 
national and international condemnation for misuse of public office.  NAB itself is a 
“totally non-transparent institution” that was used very selectively by Musharraf’s 
administration as a political tool.230 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States shocked the world 
and changed the state of Pakistani politics once again.  The U.S. government needed 
Musharraf’s help against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and was willing to pay for it, yet they 
feared alignment with what some argued was a simple military dictatorship and thus 
helped Musharraf become ‘elected’ as leader of the country in 2002.  Once again, history 
repeated itself.  In 1993, after Nawaz Sharif was dismissed and an interim ‘caretaker’ 
government was installed (under the leadership of former World Bank Vice President 
Moeen Qureishi) there was a major attempt to pursue wealthy industrialists who were 
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guilty of defaulting on government loans.231  However, when Bhutto was elected (again) 
in 1993 that effort was sidelined by her administration’s unwillingness to pursue the 
policy, and the same failed attempt at reform became apparent when Musharraf officially 
assumed the Presidency in 2002.   
Although many believe that Musharraf’s government was ‘cleaner’ than the 
elected governments of the previous decade, by the mid-2000s any progress that had been 
made quickly backpedalled.  The concern was always that Musharraf now held two 
offices simultaneously, something that was not allowed by the Pakistani Constitution.  
For this and other reasons Musharraf despised the Supreme Court since the beginning of 
his assumption of power and had initially tried to force the Justices to sign an oath that 
they would not make rulings against the military; several refused and resigned, and the 
conflict between the branches continued.232  The Court early on ruled the military 
takeover constitutional and rejected the petitions filed by Nawaz and his ruling PML(N) 
party, which challenged the military’s takeover and reinstate the Assemblies,233 yet by the 
elections of 2002 Musharraf’s fears seemed grounded in the logical assumption that the 
court – if acting freely and according to the letter of the law - would rule it 
unconstitutional for Musharraf to pursue a 2nd five-year term as President while also 
serving as the Army’s Chief.  Despite a long history of Pakistani justices deferring to the 
executive branch, the new judiciary began pushing back amid pressure from Musharraf.  
This came to a head when in March 2007 Chief Justice Chaudhry refused to accept the 
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now elected Musharraf’s ‘request’ that he tender his resignation and the President 
suspended him on accusations of misuse of office.  Only after this sparked an 80,000-
strong lawyers movement that protested the suspension and extra-constitutional powers 
assumed by the President was Chaudhry reinstated.234  Although some believed this 
would be the downfall of the Chief Justice it instead greatly improved his popularity, and 
he has remained popular and assertive on an unprecedented level since being reinstated as 
Chief Justice in 2009. 
Amid all the turmoil surrounding Chief Justice Chaudhry, one of President 
Musharraf’s most controversial laws was challenged by a group of Pakistani Lawyers.  In 
October 2007 the President issued the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), a law 
that granted immunity to all politicians, civil servants, and bureaucrats who were accused 
of corruption, embezzlement, money laundering, murder and terrorism between January 
1986 and October 12th, 1999.  Many considered the law an attempt to allow former Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto to return to Pakistan to run in upcoming elections without the 
fear of being persecuted on charges of corruption.  Shortly thereafter, on November 3rd, 
2007, Musharraf issued a state of emergency and cited recent decisions by the Supreme 
Court and terrorist attacks as justification.  Unfortunately and ironically, Bhutto returned 
to Pakistan on October 13th only to be assassinated on December 27th while running as a 
leading opposition candidate.  Her husband, Asif Ali Zardari – the previously nicknamed 
“Mr. Ten Percent” – took the mantle of Bhutto’s PPP and won the general elections for 
President in September 2008.   
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Regardless of the fact that for nearly the entire existence of the Pakistani state the 
executive was able to exert incredible control over the Pakistan Supreme Court, the NRO 
was quickly challenged on constitutional grounds and Chaudhry, the same Chief Justice 
whom Musharraf attempted to dismiss two years earlier, ruled parts of the law 
unconstitutional in late 2009.  President Zardari, not surprisingly, opposed the 
reinstatement of the Chief Justice that same year and they have been at odds ever since.235  
For the last few years the Supreme Court has been pressuring the Swiss government to 
re-open the corruption cases against President Zardari while also pressuring his 
administration to participate in and answer questions about the allegations of wrongdoing 
while Zardari was a cabinet minister in his late wife’s administration.  This came to a 
head in June 2012 when Chief Justice Chaudhry and his Supreme Court dismissed Prime 
Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani for refusing to follow the court’s orders and pursue the 
Swiss corruption inquiries against President Zardari.  The next Prime Minister, Raja 
Pervez Ashraf, faced similar pressure and charges of contempt of court if he, like Gilani, 
refuses to move forward with the investigation into Zardari’s past corruption charges. 
iii. National and International Implications for Corruption in Pakistan 
 The pervasive level of corruption in Pakistan threatens to keep the country in the 
economic, political, and developmental stagnation it has known for so long.  In 
Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index Pakistan was tied as the 
134th most corrupt country in the world, which, despite putting it in close company with 
notoriously corrupt nations such as Niger, Sierra Leone, and Belarus, is actually an 
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improvement from its 2010 score.236  It is widely understood that the level of corruption 
in Pakistan hurts both its ability to attract foreign direct investment – something that 
Pakistan sorely needs – and its ability to properly receive and take advantage of large 
amounts of international development assistance.  Additionally, as has been shown 
above, the mere perception of corruption in Pakistan has caused repeated political and 
diplomatic crises, including but not limited to constant inter-branch disputes and repeated 
military coups.  International allies have and continue to question Pakistan’s willingness 
to confront its own security and development concerns, and the general public of its most 
powerful ‘ally’ – the United States – has increasingly become critical of the gap between 
the amount of military and economic aid given Pakistan and the failure to reach the 
expectations attached to it.   
Due to these and other concerns the legitimacy of the state itself has been 
constantly called into question since its creation nearly sixty-five years ago, and current 
Pakistanis confront some level of corruption (or at least perceived corruption) on a daily 
basis.  At the time of this writing a considerable confrontation between the Chief Justice 
Chaudry’s judiciary and the executive branch continues to make news both domestically 
and abroad, and despite much international support for the assertiveness of the court 
many worry that reopening the corruption case(s) against President Zardari could throw 
the country into future turmoil.   
Additionally, domestic anger over drone strikes and other perceived injustices 
done by the United States on Pakistani soil (or to Muslim countries in general) has further 
stressed an already tense relationship.  There is no clear resolution in sight for the conflict 
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between the United States and Pakistan, nor does there seem to be any hope for a 
resolution to the continuing plague of corruption in the country.  I argue that the latter 
problem drastically affects the former conflict, and that the widespread belief among 
Pakistanis that their government is corrupt adds to the dysfunction and violence seen 
throughout the country.  Despite the presence of NAB and the increasing support for 
Pakistani politicians who push anti-corruption initiatives,237 corruption remains 
entrenched within all aspects of Pakistani governance.  Sadly, it is hard for even the most 
hopeful to argue with the views of the legal and political scholar, Hamid Khan, when he 
states that: 
Unfortunately, the lesson of fifty years of chequered [sic] constitutional 
and political history is that governments in Pakistan do not learn from 
history.  Successive governments have adopted the same course, repeated 
the same mistakes, and pushed the country deeper and deeper into the 
morass of uncertainty and insecurity.238 
 
B. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
i. Initial Assumptions 
Before turning to discuss my findings, I want to first briefly highlight some 
assumptions and aspects of my overall research experience that were particularly 
surprising.  First, although Pakistanis from all classes and political parties are quick to 
comment on the extent of corruption in politics and the civil service, that did not 
necessarily mean that they wish to see the system changed in ways that may seem 
obvious to Westerners.  Here it is important to realize that while corruption as a concept 
is negative, and thus when people speak about corruption or a “corrupt” individual they 
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are using the term derogatorily, the “corrupt” rules that keep society functioning provide 
positive and expected benefits that many Pakistanis are hesitant to live without.  For 
example, when someone would comment on how rampant corruption in some 
government agency was, or describe the corrupt dealings of their local political party 
leader, I would ask them whether they would rather continue the status quo or switch to a 
completely free, fair, and transparent democracy where corrupt leaders were quickly 
investigated and punished.  Put another way, would they rather continue living in a 
system where corruption was rampant but, when their candidate won, they could get what 
they wanted or needed; or would they rather switch to a democratic model where 
politicians were clean if that meant that they couldn’t rely on connections or small bribes 
to get what they needed.239  Generally, the interview subject balked at this point, yet in 
many cases they clearly stated that they would rather keep the current system because at 
least they would know how to get what they needed when they needed it.  This is surely 
due, at least in part, to the lack of faith that most Pakistanis have in their government ever 
being free and fair, but I believe it also speaks to a larger and more deep-seated 
understanding of how politics is supposed to work.  In this sense Pakistanis complain 
about corrupt politicians not because they think patronage or political corruption is per-se 
wrong, but rather because they are tired of their leaders stealing large sums of money 
instead of funneling it to their often poor constituencies.  On the local level, at least, 
many people understand and are comfortable with the rules, and chose only to complain 
about the corruption when their political foe is in power. 
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  The second assumption I had to dismiss follows naturally out of the first, and 
that is that the belief that corruption is a problem in Pakistan does not necessarily lead to 
the desire for help in changing the system.  This should not be overly surprising, given 
Pakistan’s historically nationalistic perspective and (especially recent) distrust of Western 
powers.  But it was surprising for me, especially because it was in contrast to opinions 
I’ve heard in other countries with high levels of corruption and similar historical reasons 
for distrusting the U.S. or the West.  For example, I’ve spoken about corruption with self-
proclaimed socialists in Guatemala and El Salvador who distrust foreign actors and the 
United States in particular, individuals whose anti-Western ideology goes far beyond 
mere complaints about past injustices.  Yet even these individuals, when discussing the 
corrupt and dysfunctional judiciary in their countries, are open to and at times even 
desperate for regional and international support for reform, training, and institutional 
capacity building.  In their eyes, external funding and support is necessary to create 
strong and legitimate institutions, which could in turn help off-set long-standing harms 
that they often believe were caused by the United States.  However, not a single person in 
Pakistan (other than one person who had previously worked with USAID) told me that 
they wanted support for anti-corruption initiatives from international organizations or 
foreign government agencies.  In many cases, the proposal of a USAID funded rule of 
law program or a UN-sponsored anti-corruption initiative was resisted even by those who 
just finished saying how hopelessly corrupt their government was. 
My third and final assumption is somewhat counter-intuitive in light of what I 
have just said, and that is that most Pakistanis I interacted with – even those who openly 
criticized and critiqued US policies whenever possible – were welcoming, kind, and 
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receptive to my presence.  Despite the seemingly relentless distrust and animosity they 
held towards the US government, everyone I spoke to believed that increased person-to-
person cultural and academic exchanges between Americans and Pakistanis were both a 
positive and necessary next step.  This was the silver lining in every uncomfortable 
experience I had, as nearly all of the people I spoke with wished for better relations 
between the US and Pakistani governments, and a deeper understanding between 
Americans and Pakistanis in general.  
 One overriding conclusion I came to in my research is that there is a major 
division between how the older generation (namely people above age 45) view corruption 
vs. how young Pakistanis view it.  It didn’t matter whether we were speaking about 
causes or consequences of corruption, the extent or types of corruption, whether it 
could/should/would be combated by the government, or even who was to blame for the 
corruption problem in the first place – the older generation had strong opinions on every 
one of these topics that did not correspond with (and in some cases directly contradicted 
that of) the younger generation’s views.  By and large, younger research subjects were far 
more likely to place the blame for corruption on Pakistanis themselves, to desire a free 
and fair system even if it meant the inability to use connections, and to believe that 
democracy and government in general was improving in Pakistan, albeit slowly.  For 
time and space purposes I will not go deeper into this right now, but I will two things: In 
my perspective this is more than simple youthful optimism, and the perspectives I heard 
from students and young professionals make me optimistic about Pakistan’s ability to 
reduce corruption and increase institutional legitimacy in the coming decades. 
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ii.  Two Types of Corruption in Pakistan 
I’d like to begin the discussion of my findings with one key distinction between 
two types of corruption in Pakistan, supplemented by a hypothetical example of how this 
process plays out in Pakistani politics.  Then I will highlight several related but somewhat 
tangential findings that I believe speak to how perceptions of corruption are changing and 
what that means for Pakistanis and those with economic or strategic interests in the 
country. 
 After several weeks of interviews it became clear to me that when speaking about 
corruption with Pakistanis it is important to distinguish between two distinct types of 
actions.  First, you have situations where powerful elites (politicians, family members of 
politicians, business leaders, high ranking military officials, etc.) steal whatever they can 
from their position, usually money, land, or political influence.  These are the “mega-
corruption” scandals that are regularly exposed in the media and, at least in theory, these 
are the types of cases that the National Accountability Bureau (Pakistan’s domestic anti-
corruption agency) is tasked with investigating.  People unanimously denounce this type 
of corruption, and much of the anti-corruption rhetoric in local media will focus on these 
mega scandals.  Yet, however damaging these scandals are to general Pakistanis, they 
involve a very small number of powerful people and often only indirectly touch the 
populace.  Strong arguments have been made that this type of corruption impedes 
development and reduces respect for the rule of law, but for those on the ground there is 
little incentive to investigate or punish leaders who steal at this level.  When the 
government or independent journalists do investigate these types of scandals they often 
get nowhere, and sometimes get killed.  I’ll call these mega scandals Type A Corruption, 
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and perhaps its most infamous example is the former President Zardari, though Nawaz 
Sharif is by no means considered clean in this respect. 
 On the other end of the spectrum you have the corruption that most Pakistanis 
experience on a near-daily basis, and what some might call local patronage networks or 
influence peddling. This type of corruption is less about stealing large sums of money or 
resources in single transactions, and more about sustaining power through local patronage 
and the cashing in of favors; landowners, politicians, and even religious figures use their 
position to provide constituents with benefits in exchange for continued support.  These 
benefits can be wide-ranging in form, and include government and private sector jobs, 
expedited passports and visas, region or town-specific development projects, or a even 
manipulation of the legal system to get someone out of jail.  I’ll call these corrupt acts 
type B corruption.  Everyone admits the existence of type B corruption, and nearly 
everyone says they have experienced both its positive and negative consequences.   
 The key distinction is this: While nearly all Pakistanis complain about Type A 
corruption (the mega scandals), most seem ready and willing to support type B 
corruption, even when they understand how it hurts them.  And even when confronted 
with the reality that wide-spread type B corruption reinforces the mega scandals in type A 
corruption, many Pakistanis have a hard time imagining a completely free and fair system 
that does not involve some form of illegal patronage.  People justify their support for type 
B corruption along many grounds, but almost always their support is grounded in a desire 
for certainty.  Put simply, the system may be broken, but they know the rules and how to 
get what they need from it.  Some even go so far to argue that this type of patronage 
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politics is the truest form of democracy (a point several prominent scholars of corruption 
have agreed with). 
 These two types of corruption manifest in a very interesting (and expected) way 
during elections, and this speaks to the way that many of Pakistan’s political dysfunctions 
are mutually reinforcing.  For example, Politician number 1 uses type B corruption (local 
patronage) to secure his power base and reach a higher office, which is accepted by the 
public.  Once in power, politician # 1 continues to use type B corruption by legally or 
illegally funneling resources and short-term benefits to his constituents.  If done 
adequately, this will ensure that his supporters do not turn against him if he pursues type 
A corruption for personal enrichment (i.e. when he steals millions of dollars from the 
state coffers).  At this point, so long as politician # 1 continues to reward his power base 
through type B corruption, no one complains about the mega-corruption scandals except 
for his political opponents and their supporters.  And even his opponents, who regularly 
denounce politician # 1’s type A corruption in public and in the media, may support and 
use type B corruption to secure their own power bases.  In this instance even vocal anti-
corruption activists, those who oppose politician # 1 for his mega corruption scandals, 
will support the use of type B corruption to get their own candidate, politician # 2, into 
office.  Politician # 2 then uses a combination of type B corruption with respect to her 
own constituents, and allegations of type A corruption against her political opponent, to 
propel herself into office.  This is a very effective way to unseat an otherwise popular 
incumbent.  But the key to this system reinforcing itself is that even if he loses, politician 
# 1 need not fear allegations of corruption because there is little to no chance of ever 
being fully prosecuted or even barred from office; Once in power, politician # 2’s 
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previously vocal anti-corruption crusade will likely fade, and she will often choose not to 
pursue investigations into politician # 1’s type A corruption.  This is because there is just 
as much incentive for corruption-related mudslinging during elections as there is for 
incumbents to avoid investigating their predecessors: everyone in power (past, present, 
and future) benefits from keeping the system’s status quo.  This is, of course, an overly 
simplistic view of the process, but it highlights the way we have witnessed the corruption 
debate play out in Pakistan during the last two elections. 
 This example leads to a somewhat unfortunate reality that I experienced: many 
Pakistanis, even those who regularly complain about corruption, are so skeptical of true 
reform that they would rather support the status quo than make a drastic break with the 
past; this is particularly true with the older generation.  As previously stated, I often 
asked people whether they would prefer the current system, where they understand the 
rules and know how to get what they need (at least while their political leader was in 
power), or whether they would want a truly free and fair system where their connections 
meant nothing; few people chose the free and fair system outright, and most eventually 
admitted that the status quo was preferable to them.  Pakistanis are angry that their 
leaders get away with stealing money and land, and that the judicial system fails to hold 
anyone with even moderate power accountable.  Yet by and large these same individuals 
seem to resist the idea of a completely free and fair democratic process where every vote 
was equal, at least partly because few believed that that was possible.  This is a long-
winded way of explaining that many Pakistanis cannot conceive of a clean and fair 
government (by global standards), and others admitted that even if that was possible it 
was not necessarily what they would want. 
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 There are also structural problems related to corruption in Pakistan, and these 
issues heavily influence how most Pakistanis perceive of state legitimacy (or, rather, the 
lack thereof).  The bureaucratic labyrinth is nearly impossible for some to penetrate 
without a bribe or a favor, and simple administrative processes (getting building permits 
or passports) continue to exhaust the patience of otherwise law-abiding citizens.  Lack of 
funding and infrastructure is of course an issue, as almost no one pays taxes or even 
utility bills, but this is too simplistic of an explanation for the near-complete inability of 
the state to provide citizens with basic services.  In general, I found that corruption is not 
perceived to be worse now than in the past, but in most cases it isn’t seen to be 
improving, either.  The only place where people perceived of less corruption than before 
was in the processing and issuing of ID cards and drivers licenses (thanks in part to the 
new NADRA registry system), and in the Ministry of Higher Education where reforms 
have reduced the level of bribes and favors that have been common in the school 
admissions process.  That being said, many university students and professors told me 
that wealthy and connected students continued to try (albeit sometimes unsuccessfully) to 
purchase their way into and out of degree programs. 
Another corruption related structural problem is the way the Pakistani civil 
service recruits and retains employees.  The recruitment process for new civil servants is 
perceived as heavily biased and based in patronage politics, and even highly educated and 
technologically sophisticated urban youth face major challenges finding jobs with the 
government.  This is at least partly because, as one young computer programmer told me, 
most government agencies are still controlled by “technological dinosaurs,” i.e. long-term 
civil servants who are resistant to change and the use of technology.  In my experience 
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Pakistani students are better versed in new technology than many of their south Asian 
counterparts (with the exception of India), and many see technology as the key to 
increased development and freedom for their generation.  However, few software 
engineers or computer programmers have access to promising careers in the domestic 
public or private sector, and those that do stay in Pakistan often work for foreign 
companies. 
 With respect to the judiciary, corruption and structural problems are evident at all 
levels.  There is a general belief that almost no one respects the rule of law, and even law-
abiding citizens have major doubts about the fairness and consistency of Pakistani 
judicial processes.  Regardless of who I spoke with - lawyers, politicians, successful 
businessmen or struggling students - not one interview subject viewed the Pakistani 
judiciary as a well-functioning and legitimate state institution.  Judges at the top are paid 
too much, while those at the bottom are paid too little and do not have their 
extracurricular activities monitored.  Lower courts are seen as highly vulnerable to 
corruption, as individuals in both criminal and civil cases generally expect to bribe or 
otherwise act to influence the behavior of judges and other court officials.  While I rarely 
heard of high-level judges being involved in corrupt practices per se, many Pakistanis see 
the higher courts as being too politically influenced and thus biased.  Although my 
research subjects generally supported the current Chief Justice’s judicial activism, this 
was more out of disgust with the benign role the Court previously held in government 
than a belief that judges do or should have the power to act in that way.  Most lawyers 
that I spoke with approved, at least in theory, of the Supreme Court’s attempt to reform 
government by investigating corrupt politicians, but they were equally concerned that the 
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court was overstepping its constitutional powers and losing touch with the needs of the 
people.  Similarly, although many lawyers supported the 2007 Lawyer’s Movement and 
the reforms it led to, most were equally concerned with the often violent and illegal 
behavior that has made Pakistani lawyers famous around the world.  All of these 
problems reduce state and institutional legitimacy and serve to uphold the status quo. 
iii. Anti-Corruption Efforts: The National Accountability Bureau 
 
In the 2013 CPI Pakistan had a score of 28 out of 100.240  This score tied it for the 
127th most clean country in the world, an honor it shared with other bastions of 
transparency such as Russia, Azerbaijan, and Bangladesh.  This ranking was, however, an 
improvement from the previous year, when it received a score of 27 and was ranked 139th 
out of 174.  Due to these poor rankings, the proliferation of corruption-related media 
articles about Pakistan, and its strategic relationship with powerful states throughout the 
globe, Pakistan has in recent years funneled considerable amounts of money into its 
domestic anti-corruption agency, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB).  While 
corruption-related prosecutions have increased in recent years in Pakistan, an overview of 
the structural problems related to NAB highlight how the CPI’s ranking system leads to 
misguided and ineffective programs in home countries. 
Like nearly every domestic anti-corruption agency, NAB suffers from a lack of 
funding, too few resources, and an unrealistic oversight structure that leaves its officials 
subject to decisions made by some of the very same people it is meant to investigate.  Its 
decisions are often made strictly along political lines, which in practical terms means that 
every few years most cases are pushed aside and new politically important (or less 
                                                
240 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013,” Transparency International, 4, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/. 
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politically sensitive) cases take their place.  But beyond all these concerns, the internal 
investigative structure of NAB is problematic because by law it is only empowered to 
investigate corruption that can be defined in monetary terms, and thus NAB’s main (and 
often only goal) is asset recovery.   
An example of the NAB case process highlights these concerns: first, a complaint 
is brought, generally from outside government, and, if it can be verified by NAB 
officials, (i.e. the complainant provides enough legitimate proof of missing funds that 
NAB believes the complainant) NAB then writes to the accused and offers them a chance 
to return some or all of the money voluntarily.  This is called voluntary return.  If the 
accused declines to do so (or simply ignores NAB, which is more often the case) the 
inquiry process begins, which is where NAB pursues its own investigation into the matter 
to gather more proof.  Once sufficient proof has been established, or rather once it is 
more than 50% likely that NAB can get a conviction, NAB contacts the person again to 
propose a plea bargain.  In nearly all cases the plea bargain contains only 2 things: the 
willingness to return the amount of funds that NAB can prove were taken, along with 
some administrative slaps on the wrist (can’t run for certain offices for certain period of 
time, unable to borrow money from the government, etc.).  If the person refuses to go 
along with the plea bargain, and the evidence is strong enough (at this point NAB is 
looking for a near certain chance of conviction) then NAB lawyers present the case to the 
courts and asks for a criminal prosecution.  At any point in this process the accused can 
voluntarily return the stolen funds with no questions asked and the investigation is 
completely stopped.  And, of course, every step in the process is subject to political 
oversight, and NAB officials told me that they would not bring cases that they felt would 
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be thrown out of court for political reasons.  Finally, NAB is not authorized to investigate 
corruption related to military officials, and they admit to fearing the judiciary’s power; 
NAB officials directly told me that they would not investigate judges regardless of proof 
because it would be counterproductive.  Finally, any complaint of corruption that did not 
come with proof of financial corruption (i.e. a complaint about unfair distributions of 
government contracts, meritless appointments or promotions, or even extensive influence 
peddling) were considered “frivolous” and outside the scope of NAB’s mandate. 
This structure offers little incentive for those accused of corruption to cooperate 
with investigations, and it certainly does not make would-be corrupt officials fear 
repercussions a NAB investigation.  Similarly, the general public seems to think NAB is 
having little to no effect.  Yet despite these concerns NAB officials are quite proud of 
their work and seem to believe that they do not need external support. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
My intent is to reframe corruption as a legal problem that inhibits the rule of law 
and promotes violence.  Countless research agendas have created extensive literature 
surrounding bribery and the effects that ‘kleptocracies’ have on the economic and human 
development of their people.241  There are, of course, numerous examples of these types 
of corrupt officials, and their negative impact cannot be denied.  Yet I argue that this 
emphasis is narrow and misguided.  More specifically, I argue that the focus on 
corruption as an economic and state-based problem helped spur policy-reforms, research, 
and development programs that focused too narrowly on measuring and combating one 
type of corruption: state officials extracting wealth from foreign governments and aid 
organizations through bribery, complex permitting schemes, or simply raiding the state 
coffers.  This, in turn, favored those most damaged by this type of corruption, namely the 
multinational corporations, banks, and national or international development 
organizations whose work was inhibited by bribes, excessive regulation, and related 
issues.  At the same time, the blame for continued underdevelopment was shifted away 
from the failure of international policy and onto corrupt and backward local leaders.  The 
rhetoric and policies that flow from this narrow and misguided corruption paradigm 
provided further support to the often-critiqued but still entrenched development dogma; 
some countries are “poor”, “underdeveloped”, “backwards” and “corrupt” while others 
are “developed”, “modern”, “sophisticated” and built on a “legitimate” system of laws 
                                                
241 Any of the previous scholarly works referenced in this thesis discuss the negative effects of 
corruption, but see also, e.g. Dawit Kiros Fantaya, “Fighting Corruption and Embezzlement in Third World 
Countries,” Journal of Criminal Law 170-176. 
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and institutions.  This perspective puts all the blame for the problem on local leaders in 
developing countries while giving responsibility for the solution – and the expertise 
needed to find a solution – to the dominant Western development organizations.242  
Corruption is an extremely sensitive problem in most countries, one that is at once 
both ubiquitous and amorphous.  It is incredibly hard to define, measure, and combat.  
Transparency International (TI), the first and perhaps most important international anti-
corruption organization, has led the way in the development of corruption-related 
research, methodological tools, and advocacy.  Through the development and 
dissemination of reports such as the Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency 
International has brought the corruption debate to the forefront of international law and 
development discussions.  Good governance and anti-corruption reform, once a side-note 
to policy discussions, are now regularly included as parts of international and bi-lateral 
development programs.  This was a positive step for the anti-corruption debate, yet it is a 
step built on a shaky and overly simplistic foundation.   
Misguided approaches lead to flawed methodologies and an emphasis on the 
wrong data; this in turn leads to a misunderstanding of the problem, which later leads to 
ineffective or unrealistic laws and anti-corruption institutions.  This is the problem with 
the CPI.  I am not arguing that measuring perceptions is the wrong model – corruption is 
incredibly hard to measure in any form.  Rather I argue that if we measure perceptions we 
cannot simply focus on the perceptions of elites (businessmen, academics, and policy 
makers) because this will necessarily skew the results and lead to the creation of laws that 
simply benefit those elites by combating the corruption they are most concerned about 
                                                
242 Sundhya Pahuja, “Global Poverty and the Politics of Good Intentions,” in In Transition: 
Human Rights, Development, and Restorative Justice, eds. Ruth Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen, Law  
(Oxford, UK: Hart Publishers, 2011). 
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(e.g. by creating anti-corruption agencies designed as asset recovery tools).  This is 
especially problematic if countries are ranked based on the perceptions of foreigners; if 
corruption is so detrimental to the daily lives of Salvadorans and Pakistanis, we should be 
measuring their perceptions of how corrupt their government is.  Instead, reports like the 
CPI measure the perceptions of local and foreign elites who have different interests than 
the public, and then use those perceptions to rally support among the masses - by creating 
misperceptions of corruption - for policy changes that ultimately will not affect their 
daily lives. 
Scholars and policy-makers that attempt to study corruption often do so because 
corruption is seen as detrimental to economic development, state legitimacy, violence and 
the rule of law in all countries.243  Yet the framework they use, including the reliance on 
reports such as the CPI, is misguided and needs to be reformed.244  I argue that the 
current CPI methodology does far more to shape perceptions and reinforce stereotypes 
within and across populations than it does to promote a uniform understanding of pre-
existing perceptions about corruption in various countries.  Thus, it is not surprising that 
the anti-corruption agencies created in the late 1990s and early 2000s are already 
receiving criticism for lack of effect (e.g. NAB in Pakistan).  Misguided laws or legal 
institutions lead to unimpressive results and often-unexpected negative effects; law and 
development scholars know this all too well.  This analysis of the CPI shows why it is 
(perhaps unfortunately) time for corruption scholars and policy makers to come to the 
same understanding about their work. 
                                                
243 See, e.g., Fisman and Miguel, Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of 
Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
 
244 Brown and Cloke, “Neoliberal Reform, Governance and Corruption in the South: Assessing the 
International Anti-Corruption Crusade,” 273-291. 
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A. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFRAMING THE DEBATE 
The goal of this research is to critique the mainstream anti-corruption debate by 
showing how ineffective policies stem from a limited understanding of the corruption’s 
nuances.  In some ways this critique is not new, as it parallels many critiques of 
international development efforts throughout the past half-century; built on good 
intentions and supported by international experts with degrees and experience, millions of 
dollars spent and years of effort extolled implementing policies often leads to 
unimpressive results.  For the apologists of the dominant perspective, these results are 
explained by blaming local leaders or even entire societies for their failure to properly 
implement the otherwise strong economic and political policies provided to them.  To 
these scholars and corruption ‘experts’, corruption is nothing more than a result of an 
imbalance in economic incentives coupled with over-regulation.  This perspective treats 
corruption as solely a financial crime that is often synonymous with bribery.  Reducing 
the size and strength of government while increasing transparency mechanisms will 
reduce rent-seeking opportunities and maximize chances that free trade and foreign 
investment will lead to economic growth.  Yet this takes time, so countries can and 
should create anti-corruption institutions (often built with money from international 
donors) that are tasked with publically exposing corrupt behavior and seeking to recover 
assets from those who plunder the state.  Those who espouse the dominant perspective 
believe that these two broad sets of actions will reduce corruption while simultaneously 
increasing economic and political development in even the most “backward” of societies.   
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This view is inadequate for at least three reasons, as has been shown by the 
examples of El Salvador and Pakistan.  First, corruption varies in definition, form, and 
extent, yet at the same time it is a very moral and political problem; it ignites emotions 
and informs deeper understandings of the state-citizen relationship.  The dominant 
perspective fails to consider how people define corruption within their own nation, 
culture, or even social group.  Thus, defining corrupt behavior according to economics 
and legality may be valuable for standardization but often risks missing the point in 
individual contexts.  For example, in many places in the world patronage is very different 
than bribery and lobbying seems like a legal form of extortion.  I argue that any 
international effort to combat corruption must first consider re-defining the term.  
Granted, scholars and international organizations will likely not be comfortable 
combating a problem that is not or cannot be given some form of universal definition.  
Nonetheless, corruption can still be defined broadly enough to encompass a wide-range 
of acts that in any given context may or may not be considered corrupt by the local 
population.  For this purpose I propose a defining corruption as “the abuse of trust by an 
individual or organization in a position of power that often, but not always, is in return 
for a pecuniary or other personal gain.”  This definition is broad enough to include both 
public and private actors, and it could be expanded or contracted based upon local 
perceptions of what constitutes corrupt behavior.  The focus is on trust, not money, which 
allows for a flexible approach defining the term based upon what makes corrupt behavior 
“bad” in a local context.  This type of definition would allow each region, country, or 
even locality to choose which behavior they believe to be corrupt and initiate policies to 
prevent, detect, and punish such actions.   
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Second, the dominant perspective is built upon the foundation of tenets of 
neoliberal economics, a theory that has is no longer taken as the gospel truth.  Limiting 
the size and strength of government often simply creates new incentives and avenues for 
corrupt behavior, and transparency mechanisms – despite their lofty goals – fail to 
address underlying societal problems that lead to corrupt behavior in the first place.  
Furthermore, the belief that economic or even political growth will necessarily limit 
corrupt behavior has been shown to be false; while many advanced, wealthy countries 
experience lower levels of corruption than many nations still struggling with economic 
and political underdevelopment, this does not prove causation.  In some “clean” 
countries, such as the United States, behavior that was once considered corrupt (and still 
is considered that in other countries) is simply legalized and regulated alongside other 
normal government functions.  Similarly, the “cleanest” countries are not those with the 
most limited government but nearly always include Scandinavian and other democratic-
socialist states that certainly do not follow the “lean government” model.  Therefore, anti-
corruption platforms must be tailored upon the specific economic and political conditions 
of the state in which they are being implemented.  In some cases anti-corruption efforts 
will require limiting the extent and role of government, yet in other cases anti-corruption 
efforts may require expanding and strengthening an otherwise ineffective bureaucracy.  
The latter will be especially true in countries that suffer from extreme underdevelopment, 
lack of resources and technology, or violence and civil conflict.   
Third, anti-corruption institutions must be tailored to address the type of 
corruption that is most detrimental to the society in which the institution works.  While 
there will always be political and economic limitations to any anti-corruption work, this 
  129 
should not justify narrowing the mandate of an anti-corruption agency so much that it is 
essentially a toothless collections agent (e.g. NAB in Pakistan).  If an anti-corruption 
agency does not have the political or financial support to conduct investigations and 
prosecute individuals it should focus its efforts elsewhere.  For example, creating 
educational campaigns and working to increase civic engagement (e.g. TEG in El 
Salvador) may seem limiting and/or counter-productive to current corruption-related 
crises, but I argue that in the long run these programs will have a stronger effect than 
basic asset recovery mechanisms as practiced by NAB.  This is because NAB’s limited 
abilities and narrow mandate does little to change the culture of corruption in Pakistan; in 
fact, it may be part of the problem because it adds further support to the wide-spread 
cynicism related to fighting corruption and punishing corrupt officials.  Sometimes, 
publicizing a minor slap on the wrist may actually limit deterrence by reinforcing 
stereotypes about how powerful people are untouchable.  This was certainly the 
perspective I witnessed in Pakistan.  Therefore, NAB either needs to be given a broader 
mandate so that it can actually investigate and punish corrupt officials or it needs to 
redirect its focus towards understanding and shaping public perceptions of corrupt 
behavior in the way that TEG does.  In an ideal world, anti-corruption agencies would be 
able to do both, but until that happens each agency need to be focused around mandates 
that are politically possible and economically feasible in their own unique local context. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 One of the key goals of this research was to better understand the link between 
corruption and violence so as to support the argument that corruption – or at least high 
perceptions of corruption – limit respect for the rule of law.  Unfortunately, my research 
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was not sufficient to establish this link unequivocally.  This may involve research into 
how corrupt societies perceive their judicial systems to be, which may be particularly 
important in post-conflict countries confronting serious human rights problems.   
Tolerance of corrupt behavior, or cynicism about the possibility of curbing 
corrupt behavior, may clearly lead to a generalized distrust of government and 
willingness to break the law; in many cases this may encourage violence at the 
individual, societal, or even international level.  However, my research did not solidify 
this connection to the extent that I had hoped, and thus more research needs to be 
completed to better understand the relationship between corruption and violence in 
individual societies.  As stated above, this correlation was evident in El Salvador but less 
so in Pakistan, although I believe that some of this was due to time limitations and other 
research constraints (e.g. the geopolitical and security concerns surrounding the timing of 
my Pakistan trip, my inability to speak Urdu, etc.).  I believe that drawing connections 
between corruption and violence is necessary both for a clearer understanding of the 
problem and for creating the political will necessary to combat it.  If corrupt behavior was 
linked to violence, civil conflict, and even terrorism it may improve the public and 
political motivations for combating it.  Many people are simply resigned to the fact that 
the rich get richer, the powerful stay powerful, etc. and I believe that this is why there is 
often limited support for – or faith in – individual anti-corruption efforts.  However, if a 
clear link was drawn between corruption and impunity and the violence that effects large 
numbers of Salvadorans and Pakistanis, for example, there may be a stronger push from 
both the public and political leaders to devise solutions and combat this behavior.  Much 
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more research needs to be completed on an individual country basis to understand how 
this complex yet widespread problem manifests in different environments.   
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